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PROTECTING RIGHTS OR WAIVING
THEM? WHY "NEGOTIATED RISK"
SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM
ASSISTED LIVING LAW
ERIC M. CARLSON*

INTRODUCTION
Assisted living facilities care for approximately one million elderly
Americans.' According to assisted living supporters, a key facet of assisted living is
the value placed on residents' autonomy. Supporters praise "negotiated risk" as an
important tool for promoting and supporting that autonomy.2
This article demonstrates that negotiated risk actually is harmful to assisted
living residents. The central problem is that negotiated risk has no settled
definition. Discussions of--or arguments about-negotiated risk tend to careen
back and forth fruitlessly due to the discussants' continued inability or
unwillingness to define negotiated risk in the first place.
In general, the shape-shifting of negotiated risk occurs between two shapes. In
one shape, negotiated risk signifies a resident's decision to pursue an arguably risky
course of action over the expressed concerns of the facility's staff. In the other
shape, negotiated risk is an agreement in which a resident waives the facility's
liability for certain inadequacies of care.
In the first shape, for example, a negotiated risk agreement might document a
diabetic resident's decision to eat sweets against medical advice. In the second

* Eric Carlson is the Director of the Long-Term Care Project at the National Senior Citizens Law Center
(Los Angeles, CA). Mr. Carlson thanks the Borchard Foundation Center on Law and Aging for
supporting the writing of this article. Thanks also to Gene Coffey, Jamie Hall, and Linda Phillips for
their assistance in preparing the article, and to David Lipschutz and Graciela Martinez for their helpful

comments. Small portions of this article are adapted from a previous article by the author: In the Sheep's
Clothing of Resident Rights: Behind the Rhetoric of "NegotiatedRisk" in Assisted Living, NAELA Q.,

Spring 2003, at 4.
1.Assisted Living Federation of America, Frequently Asked Questions About Assisted Living,
http://www.alfa.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3285 (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
2. See infra Part V.
3. See generally ROBERT JENKENS ET AL., A STUDY OF NEGOTIATED RISK AGREEMENTS IN

ASSISTED LIVING: FINAL REPORT 8-24 (2006) (discussing the difficulty in reaching a consensus among
patients, advocates, providers, and policy makers regarding the appropriate purpose of "negotiated risk"
agreements and the resulting inability to constructively address related issues).
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shape, the negotiated risk agreement would release the facility from any liability
related to a resident's falls or pressure sores.
This article explores the various shapes assumed by the term "negotiated
risk." The article first describes the assisted living model and explains how
negotiated risk agreements were theorized initially as a mechanism to allow
assisted living facilities to retain ill and frail residents longer, without risking legal
liability for providing inadequate care. The article then examines how negotiated
risk proponents have attempted to move the debate away from the consideration of
liability waivers, by recasting negotiated risk in public as a tool for protecting
residents' decision-making rights.
The result has been confusion in public policy discussions and, most
conspicuously, in state law. Currently, fifteen states' laws refer to "negotiated risk"
or a comparable term,4 and one additional state has developed a standard form for a
"Negotiated Risk Contract."5 In general, the relevant state laws refer ambiguously
to disputes, agreements, and risk, without indicating whether negotiated risk
involves inadequate facility care or, at the other extreme, a resident's decision to
refuse the facility's services or advice. This article examines the state laws and
places each state into one of eight categories, depending generally on the extent to
which the state law relates to care planning, disputes, inadequate care, and/or
waiver of liability.
This article recommends that the term "negotiated risk" be abandoned.
Proponents' professed goal-allowing residents to make decisions that conflict
with professional recommendations-can be accomplished without negotiated risk
through established care planning procedures.
Also, any waiver of facility liability is likely unenforceable. Courts uniformly
refuse to enforce consumer liability waivers in health care. 6 A court almost
certainly would find a public policy violation in any agreement that waived an
assisted living facility's liability for care provided to a resident.
Finally, the term "negotiated risk" at this point has no settled meaning. It is
used at the extremes to refer to two very different types of situations: when a
facility is unable to provide needed care, but also when a resident refuses care that a
facility is willing and able to provide. Compounding the problem, most of the
relevant law fails even to stake out a position between these two extremes, and
instead speaks only in lofty generalities that often fail to rule out either extreme.
Assisted living law should be rewritten across the country to eliminate any
mention of negotiated risk. Due to the term's vagueness and misuse, it can be used

4. See discussion infra Part VI.
5. UTAH BUREAU OF HEALTH FACILITY LICENSING, UTAH DEP'T OF HEALTH, NEGOTIATED RISK
CONTRACT,

http://health.utah.gov/hflcra/forms/risk.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).

6. See infra Part VIII.B.2-3.
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as justification for an inadequate quality of care. Negotiated risk endangers the
health and safety of elderly assisted living residents across the country.
I.

ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES CARE FOR ONE MILLION
VULNERABLE RESIDENTS

Assisted living is a form of long-term care provided to older persons who
cannot live independently. Generally, residents live together in a facility comprised
of living units that may be either private or shared.7
Initially, assisted living occupied the range of care between independent
living and nursing home care. In recent years, however, assisted living has moved
increasingly to provide care for residents whose needs previously would have
required residence in a nursing home. 8 This change, along with the growing
popularity of assisted living, has led to increases in the numbers of facilities and
residents. The United States presently has 20,000 to 36,000 assisted living
9
facilities, with a total of approximately one million residents.
Federal law contains essentially no care standards for assisted living. As a
result, the definition and regulation of assisted living is done almost entirely at the
state level.1 ° Terminology varies from state to state, and although the most common
term is "assisted living facility," other terms in use include "residential care facility
for the elderly" in California, "home for the aged" in Michigan, "housing with
services establishment" in Minnesota, and "personal care home" in Mississippi."
II.

A.

"ASSISTED LIVING" Is LOOSELY DEFINED

Assisted Living OperatorsAdvocate for a Broad,Inclusive Definition

Surprisingly, defining "assisted living" can be difficult and contentious.12 One
problem is the perhaps inevitable "big tent" philosophy among lobbyists for

7. ROBERT MOLLICA & HEATHER JOHNSON-LAMARCHE, NAT'L ACAD. OF STATE HEALTH POL'Y,
STATE RESIDENTIAL CARE AND ASSISTED LIVING POLICY: 2004, at 1-19 (2005).

8. Id. at 1-7 to -11.
9. Id. at 1-2 (reporting that, as of 2004, a total of 36,451 facilities contained approximately
937,000 units/beds); Assisted Living Federation of America, supra note I (reporting that 20,000 assisted
living facilities house over one million residents). The large discrepancy in the number of facilities
stems from the fact that assisted living is not easily defined, as well as the fact that various state laws use
different definitions and terminology. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., ERIC CARLSON, LONG-TERM CARE ADVOCACY §§ 5.101-5.152 (2006) (summarizing

states' assisted living laws); Patrick A. Bruce, Note, The Ascendancy of Assisted Living: The Casefor
Federal Regulation, 14 ELDER L.J. 61, 67-82 (2006).
11.

E.g., ERIC M. CARLSON, NAT'L SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CTR., CRITICAL ISSUES IN ASSISTED

LIVING: WHO'S IN, WHO'S OUT, AND WHO'S PROVIDING THE CARE 72-73

(2005).

12. E.g., ASSISTED LIVING WORKGROUP, ASSURING QUALITY IN ASSISTED LIVING: GUIDELINES
FOR FEDERAL AND STATE POLICY, STATE REGULATIONS, AND OPERATIONS 12-19 (2003) (noting the

inability to reach a consensus regarding the definition of "assisted living"); Paula C. Carder, The Social
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assisted living providers. No facility wants to be left out of the assisted living tent
so providers tend to push for broad definitions of assisted living that include, for
example, both a 200-bed facility that provides extensive health care services, and a
six-bed facility that provides only room, board, and minimal assistance with
13
activities of daily living.
In 2006, the Empire State Association of Assisted Living, a New York
assisted living trade association, commissioned a report advocating that routine
nursing services not be required of the state's "enhanced assisted living
residences."' 14 In arguments that duplicate those made by other trade associations
across the country, the report asserts that a nursing service requirement would
"overmedicalize" assisted living and make it unaffordable. 5 The report
recommends that nursing services not be part of a facility's services, and instead
16
"be provided [by] or arranged for and charged to the individual resident.'
B.

Assisted Living Is Based on PurportedlyAttractive, but Ethereal,Concepts

Another problem in defining "assisted living" is the ethereal nature of much
of the literature on assisted living policy.' 7 Consider this explanation by a
prominent assisted living proponent:
Perhaps the most radical aspect of assisted living is a shift in values
orientation, which results in redefinitions of consumer empowerment,
best practice concepts, and quality. This shift in thinking supports
World of Assisted Living, 16 J. AGING STUDIES 1 (2002), reprinted in GRAY AREAS: ETHNOGRAPHIC
ENCOUNTERS WITH NURSING HOME CULTURE 263, 278-79 (Phillip B. Stafford ed., 2003) ("[Bloth
policy makers and researchers.., are frustrated with the lack of a standard definition").
13. See, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 290-5-35-.04(o) (2006) (defining "Personal Care Home" as
"any dwelling, whether operated for profit or not, which undertakes through its ownership or
management to provide or arrange for the provision of housing, food service, and one or more personal
services for two or more adults who are not related to the owner or administrator by blood or marriage");
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12-1.1 (1994 & Supp. 2003) (defining "Assisted living center" as "any
institution, rest home, boarding home, place, building, or agency which is maintained and operated to
provide personal care and services which meet some need beyond basic provision of food, shelter, and
laundry in a free standing, physically separate facility which is not otherwise required to be licensed
under this chapter").
14. LORI SIEVERS, HINMAN STRAUB, P.C., ASSISTED LIVING THAT FEW CAN AFFORD: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE OVER-MEDICALIZATION OF THE ENHANCED ASSISTED LIVING RESIDENCE AND A
SENSIBLE ALTERNATIVE 15 (2006), available at http://www.ny-assisted-living.org/pdf/ESAAL
_EALRReport.pdf.
15. Id.at 13.
16. Id. at 15.
17. See, e.g., ROSALIE A. KANE & KEREN BROWN WILSON, AM. ASS'N RETIRED PERSS., ASSISTED
LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES: A NEW PARADIGM FOR RESIDENTIAL CARE FOR FRAIL OLDER
PERSONS? 8 (1993) (discussing assisted living as "based on principles of individuality, independence,
privacy, dignity, choice, and a homelike environment"); Marshall B. Kapp, Who Is Responsible For
This? Assigning Rights and Consequences in Elder Care, 1997 J. AGING & SOC. POL'Y 51, 57
(characterizing assisted living as employing an "underlying philosophical paradigm of homelike
individual autonomy and self-determination").
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human principles, such as dignity, choice, and privacy, that are easily
violated when individuals are dependent on others for care....
...Empowerment is the redistribution or restoration of opportunities to
promote reciprocity and autonomy for those in society labeled as
disabled, disenfranchised, or dependent. Assisted living is uniquely
positioned to support fundamental change to achieve empowerment of
frail, often significantly impaired adults. This empowerment is achieved
by embracing the concepts of shared responsibility, bounded choice, and
managed risk. Without these grounding precepts, empowerment cannot
be achieved. They enhance the potential for reciprocal actions and
reduce objections to autonomy for individuals whose ability to act
independently is compromised. Shared responsibility assumes that rights
and responsibilities are balanced. The degree of autonomy exercised in
the decision-making process is weighed against the degree of
responsibility accepted for the outcome of the decision. Bounded choice
reflects the recognition that personal capacity, societal limits,
organizational capacity, and situational circumstances set the parameters
of autonomy for all individuals. Managed risk is a process that defines
the responsibilities and choices associated with empowerment.18
Of course, such worthy but elusive concepts as dignity, choice, and privacy
are not easily put into practice. These appealing terms are mentioned commonly in
state assisted living law, but in most cases references to these terms occur in
19
definitional sections that have little real-world significance.
The most obvious example of the gap between theory and practice is the
presence of shared units in assisted living. Much of the initial enthusiasm for
assisted living was based on the image of a person receiving necessary care in her
own home or apartment. 20 Today, however, state assisted living laws routinely

18. Keren Brown Wilson, Assisted Living as a Model of Care Delivery, in ENHANCING AUTONOMY
IN LONG-TERM CARE: CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES 139, 145-46 (Lucia M. Gamroth et al. eds., 1995).
19. See, e.g., ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 77, § 295.100(a) (2001) (identifying the purpose of assisted living
law as, in part, "to permit the development and availability of assisted living establishments and shared
housing establishments based on a social model that promotes the dignity, individuality, privacy,
independence, autonomy, and decision-making ability and the right to negotiated risk of those persons");
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-7.15 (West 2007) (defining assisted living services as a means to "promote
resident self-direction and participation in decisions that emphasize independence, individuality,
privacy, dignity and homelike surroundings to residents who have been assessed to need these services,
including residents who require formal long-term care"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 7102(11) (2001)
(describing assisted living as promoting "resident self-direction and active participation in decisionmaking while emphasizing individuality, privacy and dignity").
20. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 18, at 141; Rosalie A. Kane, Autonomy and Regulation in LongTerm Care: An Odd Couple, An Ambiguous Relationship, in ENHANCING AUTONOMY IN LONG-TERM
CARE: CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 18, at 68, 80-81 ("In my view, the minimum
requirements in the U.S. cultural context includes a singly occupied room with a self-contained bath.").
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allow an assisted living unit to be shared occupancy, sometimes by as many as four
residents.21
Similarly difficult to implement are concepts such as "shared responsibility,"
"bounded choice," and "managed risk." Like many terms related to negotiated risk,
the meaning of these terms is far from settled.
C.

The Assisted Living Model Relies on Individual Negotiations

A third problem in defining assisted living is that the academic model often
abstains on important issues, and instead dictates that specifics be negotiated with
the facility by the resident or resident's representative. 22 As a result, state-law
definitions are likely to gloss over difficult issues in defining assisted living, by
assuming explicitly or implicitly that those issues will be resolved by the resident
and the facility.
Perhaps the purest example of a negotiation-based model is Michigan's
system for housing-with-services establishments; a license is not required,23 and the
relevant statutes do little more than specify certain unremarkable requirements for a
contract with a resident. 24 More commonly, negotiation-based models appear in
state assisted living laws through disclosure requirements.25 The basic premise of

21. MOLLICA & JOHNSON-LAMARCHE, supra note 7, at 1-16 ("Ten states have licensing categories
that allow four people to share a room; three states allow three people to share units."); see, e.g., GA.
COMp. R. & REGS. 290-5-35-.07(1 1)(b) (1994) (restricting total residents per bedroom to "no more than
four"); 410 IND. ADMIN. CODE 16.2-5-1.6(g)(5) (2003) (requiring no more than four beds per room for
facility construction plans submitted for approval after July 1, 1984); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3701-1764(B)(3) (2007) (establishing a limit of no more than four residents per unit).
22. ROBERT L. MOLLICA & KIMBERLY IRVIN SNOW, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL'Y,

STATE ASSISTED LIVING POLICY: 1996, at i (1996) (noting that states set minimum standards and assume
that market forces will produce an adequate quality of care); see, e.g., ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 77,
295.100(a) (2007) ("Assisted living ... should be based on a contract model designed to result in a
negotiated agreement between the resident or the resident's representative and the provider, clearly
identifying the services to be provided.").
23. See generally MAUREEN MICKUS, COMPLEXITIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE LONG TERM CARE
POLICY

FRONTIER:

MICHIGAN'S

ASSISTED

LIVING

FACILITIES

(2002),

available

at

http://www.ippsr.msu.edu/Publications/ARAssistedLiving.pdf (noting that licensure is not required
under Michigan law for all facilities contained within the broad category of assisted living facilities).
24. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.26503 (West Supp. 2001). Michigan also licenses homes for
the aged which, in comparison to housing-with-services establishments, are subject to more detailed
regulatory requirements. Id. § 333.20106(3) (West 2001).
25. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 247.026(b)(4)(B) (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2006)
(requiring that a state-developed standardized disclosure form be provided to each prospective resident
or their representative); 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 92.3(13) (2007) (outlining the required elements of the
Texas standardized disclosure form); 13-110-007 VT. CODE R. § 6.11 (2007) (describing the "Uniform
Consumer Disclosure" requirements which include, inter alia, disclosure of services, rates, and
admission and discharge criteria).
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these laws is that consumers will be protected if facilities are required at admission
to disclose certain important aspects of the care that will be provided.26
The lack of a coherent and consistent assisted living definition is important
context for this article's discussion of negotiated risk. Because assisted living law is
often ambiguous as to whether certain care can or must be provided, a facility may
have significant leeway to argue that a resident assumes a legal risk by living there.
III. THE DEFINITION OF "NEGOTIATED RISK" IS MURKY

A thorough analysis of "negotiated risk" is hampered by confusion as to what
negotiated risk is, most importantly, whether or not negotiated risk includes waiver
of a facility's legal liability.27 As acknowledged in a leading article advocating
negotiated risk, there is "no consensus among commentators, regulators and
accreditation bodies of what a negotiated risk agreement actually is-or should
be.",2 8 Additionally, the term "negotiated risk" itself is not always employedincreasingly, "negotiated risk" is being replaced with references to "managed risk"
or "shared responsibility."
By and large, the lack of consensus is not attributable to state-to-state
variations. Evasiveness regarding legal liability is the most prominent commonality
in states' negotiated risk laws. 29 By using terms such as "accepting responsibility,"
state laws enable negotiated risk to be defended as a care planning device, but also
allow facilities in other, less public situations to claim that negotiated risk
30
agreements waive a facility's liability.
This same evasiveness appears in public defenses of negotiated risk. For
example, the negotiated risk manual commissioned by the Assisted Living
Federation of America (ALFA) argues that "the primary purpose of risk agreements
is not to shield providers from liability."3 1 This argument, however, is contrary to
the explanation given earlier in the manual that "[i]n a true negotiated risk

26. See, e.g., Assisted Living Fed'n of Am., ALFA Public Policy Platform (2004),
http://www.alfa.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3325 (referencing "informed choice," and stating that
"[flull mutual disclosure helps to ensure that residents and families are aware of all rights and options
for care"); see also Bruce, supra note 10, at 73-74 (discussing state disclosure requirements and
concluding that "[lack of disclosure can have severe consequences for consumers").
27. See, e.g., JENKENS ET AL., supra note 3, at 9-11, 14-15.
28. Allen A. Lynch, 1I & Sarah A. Teachworth, Risky Business: The Enforceability and Use of
Negotiated Risk Agreements, 10 SENIORS HOUSING & CARE J. 3, 5 (2002).
29. See infra Part VI.
30. See, e.g., 016-06-001 ARK. CODE R. § 704 (Weil 2007) (regulating "acceptance of
responsibility" in Level I assisted living facilities); 016-06-002 ARK. CODE R. § 704 (Weil 2007)
(regulating the same in Level II assisted living facilities); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 50.034(3)(d) (West 2003 &
Supp. 2006) (requiring that negotiated risk agreements establish that each resident "accepts
responsibility").
31.

(1999).

KENNETH L. BURGESS, NEGOTIATED RISK AGREEMENTS IN ASSISTED LIVING COMMUNITIES 60
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agreement, the 'consideration' the resident gives back to the community is a
willingness to release the community from liability for harm or injury to the extent
32
that harm results from the resident's' exercise of his free choice and autonomy.,
One year after the manual's release, its author wrote that a state's prohibition of
liability waivers had "fatally curtailed" negotiated risk.33
As a result of this confusion, there now are two negotiated risks: the "true"
negotiated risk and a perverse doppelgd.nger.34 Unfortunately, most explanations of
assisted living fail to recognize the two sides of negotiated risk and, if pressed on
the issue, assisted living stakeholders typically differ on which negotiated risk
version is true, and which is the doppelgdinger. 35 In general, assisted living facility
representatives argue that true negotiated risk is about honoring resident
preferences and, in response, resident advocates claim that the resident autonomy
36
argument is a Trojan horse for bringing liability waivers into assisted living.
IV. NEGOTIATED RISK WAS PROPOSED TO WAIVE A FACILITY'S
LIABILITY FOR INADEQUATE CARE

Waiver of liability generally arises in what this article terms the "inadequate
care" scenario. In this scenario, negotiated risk allows an assisted living facility to
retain a resident whose needs exceed the facility's care-providing capabilities.37
The backdrop for this scenario is the amorphousness of an assisted living
standard of care. Because, as discussed above, the definition of assisted living is
difficult to pin down, it can be equally or even more difficult to specify what type

32. Id. at 42.
33. Kenneth L. Burgess, Negotiated Risk Agreements-One Year Later, ASSISTED LIVING TODAY,
Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 35, 36.
34. See Stephanie Edelstein, Assisted Living: Recent Developments and Issues for Older
Consumers, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 373, 379-80 (1998) (noting that negotiated risk agreements are
likely to involve residents choosing to act against facility advice, but may waive a facility's liability for
inadequate care); Rosalie A. Kane & Carrie A. Levin, Who's Safe? Who's Sorry? The Duty to Protect
the Safety of Clients in Home- and Community-Based Care, 22 GENERATIONS 76, 80 (1998) (indicating
that a negotiated risk agreement is sometimes used when a "consumer's preference counters that of the
provider" and, at other times, "clarifies what kind of assistance can and cannot be expected in the
setting"); Gregory Hendrickson & Kenneth Burgess, CreatingEnforceable NegotiatedRisk Agreements,
CONTEMPORARY LONG TERM CARE, Feb. 1999, at 49 (asserting that negotiated risk agreement are used
to allow residents to return to assisted living facilities despite the inadequate care that is provided, but
are also used commonly when a facility's care is adequate).
35. See, e.g., MOLLICA & JOHNSON-LAMARCHE, supra note 7, at 1-14 to 1-15. But see Sandi
Petersen, Developing Risk-Management Protocols in Assisted Living, NURSING HOMES MAGAZINE,
Dec. 8, 2005 (asserting that a negotiated risk agreement should be used for "service refusal" but not "as
a means of retaining residents who are beyond the scope of care that can be provided in the setting").
36. See, e.g., JENKENS ET AL., supra note 3, at 8-13; Eric M. Carlson, In the Sheep's Clothing of
Resident Rights: Behind the Rhetoric of "Negotiated Risk" in Assisted Living, NAELA Q., Spring 2003,
at 4; Bruce Vignery & Zita Dresner, Troubling Assisted Living Facility Issues: Negotiated Risk
Agreements, ELDER LAW FORUM, Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 10.
37. Vignery & Dresner, supra note 36, at 10.

2007]

PROTECTING RIGHTS OR WAIVING THEM?

or level of service is required. 38 If a facility does not provide a certain type or level
of care, the facility may seek a corresponding liability waiver.
Assisted living proponents eschew the medical model for a social model that
purportedly emphasizes non-medical services and quality of life.39 One ramification
of this emphasis is the possibility that a facility may be unprepared to provide
certain necessary care. Negotiated risk was proposed as a means for a facility to
avoid liability for a lack of medical services and expertise, or for a relatively low
level of supervision.40
Relatively early in the development of the assisted living model, one
academic commenter suggested that providers should
Explore the legal ramifications of waivers of liability. Although one
cannot waive one's right to quality care,4' in a nursing home, care
should probably not be extended to include every facet of the resident's
decisions, cannot residents
life. If warned about the risks of various
42
make a decision to take their chances?
A facility attorney in 1995 identified "negotiated risk" as "the first buzzword
unique to assisted living. ' ' 3 As the article described, some assisted living facilities
were using negotiated risk to limit their responsibilities for resident care,
"squeezing the concept into the blueprint of written admissions or resident
contracts. Others were thinking that if a resident can be persuaded to accept a
particular service ' delivery plan, then the facility will be insulated from regulatory
and civil liability. "
Other facility attorneys have made similar observations: "Negotiated risk
agreements are intended to enable residents to reside in a non-institutional assisted
living setting even though they may have care needs that would normally require
that they reside in a skilled nursing environment. 4 5 Similarly, another facility
attorney explains that "[a] negotiated risk contract is where the resident agrees to

38. Seesupra Part Ill.
39. Wilson, supra note 18, at 143.
40. See JENKENS ET AL., supra note 3, at 8-11.
41. See infra Part VIII.B.
42. Kane, supra note 20, at 85; see also Keren Brown Wilson, Assisted Living: A Model of
Supportive Housing, in 2 ADVANCES IN LONG-TERM CARE 196, 210 (Paul R. Katz et al. eds., 1993)
(proposing "managed risk" for assisted living).
43. Joseph L. Bianculli, Negotiated Risk-An OperationalIssue, PROVIDER, Nov. 1995, at 32; see
also JOSEPH L. BIANCULLI & KEREN BROWN WILSON, NEGOTIATED RISK IN ASSISTED LIVING 1 (1996)
(asserting that negotiated risk is "a buzzword specific to assisted living").
44. Bianculli, supra note 43, at 32.
45. Lynch & Teachworth, supra note 28, at 26 n. I1 (citing Joel S. Goldman, Potential Legal
Roadblocks Ahead for Assisted Living, Address at the ALFA Fall 2001 National Conference & Expo
Conference Proceedings 299 (Oct. 21-23, 2001)).
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accept a certain setting and they assume the risk that that setting may or may not be
46
appropriate for their care."
Some assisted living providers have embraced the liability-waiver vision of
negotiated risk. According to the public policy director for an assisted living
corporation, needs related to "diabetes, skin breakdown, falls, or wandering" can be
addressed through use of a negotiated risk agreement.47
A "healthcare consulting firm specializing in risk management for the assisted
living industry" has recommended negotiated risk agreements as a facility's
response to the fact that "[m]any residents' acuity levels will exceed what an
assisted living community can provide., 48 In a separate article, the firm's vice
president of clinical operations explained how negotiated risk could be used to
address areas in which a facility's care might be inadequate:
Once residents are assessed, providers should implement shared-risk, or
managed-risk, agreements for any potential risk identified for the
resident, such as falls, wandering away from the community, or even the
potential for skin breakdown. These vitally important agreements
document that the resident and family have been advised of the inherent
risks that come with choosing a long-term care model that supports
quality of life, such as assisted living, as opposed to a primarily quality
of care skilled nursing model.
Because assisted living providers may not provide 24-7 care (and are
not expected to), these agreements leave no question that the resident
and the family understand this concept and accept their share of
responsibility in the resident's plan of care.49

46. John Durso, Testimony to Comm'n on Affordable Housing and Health Facility Needs for
Seniors in the 21st Century (Nov. 7, 2001), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
seniorscommission/pages/hearings/011107/durso.html; see also N.H. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., FINAL REPORT: H.B. 1319 -NEGOTIATED RISK 2 (2000) ("The issues sparking the debate on
negotiated risk appear to focus on transferring clients who may wish to remain in a residential placement
environment to which they have grown accustomed when that residence is no longer able to meet their
identified care needs."); Stephanie Kissam et al., Admission and Continued-Stay Criteriafor Assisted
Living Facilities, 51 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y. 1651, 1652 (2003) (recommending a "managed risk
agreement" with liability waiver if a resident remains in an assisted living facility beyond the point at
which the facility can meet the resident's care needs); Elisabeth Belmont et al., A Guide to Legal Issues
in Life-Limiting Conditions, 38 J. HEALTH L. 145, 188 (2005) (asserting that, in a negotiated risk
agreement, a "facility attempts to explain before admittance those services/responsibilities for which it
intends to be responsible, as well as those for which it intends not to be responsible").
47. Why Your Facility Should Have Negotiated Risk Agreements, Briefings on Assisted Living,
June 2000, http://www.snfinfo.com/articles/BAL06000I.cfm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (copy on file
with the Journalof Health Care Law & Policy).
48. Assisted Living Providers, http://www.tagweb.com/aprovider.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2002)
(copy on file with the Journalof Health Care Law & Policy).
49. Kendra Case, Shared Risk Starts with Resident Assessment, ASSISTED LIVING TODAY, Mar.
2002, at 27, 27.
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Similarly, a recent report clearly identifies negotiated risk as a means for a
facility to retain a resident for whom it cannot provide adequate care:
"The essential issue [in assisted living policy] is that residents not be
allowed to "'age in place" if the facility is not able to provide adequate
care. The matter is not that straightforward, however, as 19 states allow
for the completion of negotiated risk agreements that expressly allow
residents to accept certain risks associated with reduced
care, so as to
50
maximize their preferences and remain in the facility."
Consistent with these descriptions, negotiated risk agreements often are
portrayed chiefly as a means for an assisted living facility to reduce its legal
exposure. As stated in an article defending negotiated risk, "[f]or some providers,
risk consultants and lawyers, [liability waivers] are the 'magic words' of [a
negotiated risk agreement]-the words whereby the resident essentially agrees that
the provider is not liable for harm that arises from the subject risk."51 The same
article suggests negotiated risk agreements as a means of reducing a facility's
5 2
exposure to liability claims.
An insurance underwriting firm has recommended negotiated risk contracts as
a way of protecting assisted living facilities that provide an inadequate level of
care: "[B]ecause [assisted living facilities] do not provide 24/7 care ... shared-risk
agreements can significantly reduce your exposure to litigation from falls.
[Facilities] should have the resident and their family members sign a shared-risk
agreement for any resident who is either at risk, or who has sustained a fall in the
last ninety days."53
In accord, a 2004 article in ALFA's Assisted Living Today listed a "managed
risk agreement" as one of ten techniques to be used by assisted living facilities to
"avoid costly litigation. 54 The article's discussion of managed risk begins with the
admonition to "[b]e honest with the resident and the family that there may simply
be unavoidable injuries during the resident's stay at your community. Do not

50. Sheryl Zimmerman et al., How Good is Assisted Living? Findings and Implications from an
Outcomes Study, 60B JOURNALS OF GERONTOLOGY: SOC. SCI. S195, S195-96 (2005) (citing Robert
Mollica,
State
Assisted
Living
Policy
2002
(2002),
available
at
http://www.nashp.org/Files/ltc 15-AL-2002.pdf). This article, however, concludes that sixteen, not
nineteen, states utilize negotiated risk. See infra Part VI.
51. Lynch & Teachworth, supra note 28, at 10.
52. Id. at 4 ("[T]he legal exposure bome by long term care providers has been anything but limited,
with the long term care litigation 'avalanche' having crippled some operators and impacted nearly all
through less liability insurance coverage at a dramatically higher cost.").
53. Id. at 9 (quoting Lighthouse Underwriters, Assisted Living Fed'n of Am., Seminar for the Fall
Conference Risk Management (Oct. 2001)). Lynch and Teachworth further summarized a Lighthouse
Underwriters' postulation "that a lack of [negotiated risk agreements] is one reason why the plaintiff's
bar is migrating from nursing homes to assisted living facilities." Id (emphasis in original).
54. Donna J. Fudge, Staying Out of Court: Use These 10 Tips to Avoid Costly Litigation, ASSISTED
LIVING TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 18, 20.
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promise that you can keep the resident safe. 55 The article recommends that
facilities consider using contractual clauses that waive a facility's liability if a
resident is injured after failing to wait an adequate period of time for staff
assistance, and that residents understand that the facility "cannot guarantee that [the
residents] will not experience a fall or an injury from a fall. 56
V.

NEGOTIATED RISK IS CHARACTERIZED BY PROPONENTS AS A RESIDENT'S
DECISION TO ACT AGAINST FACILITY ADVICE

Presumably because the "inadequate care" scenario has proven unpopular,
negotiated risk increasingly is promoted as a resident's right to refuse the facility's
offer of services or advice. This "against-facility-advice" scenario focuses on
situations in which the facility is prepared to provide adequate care, but the resident
wants to act against the facility's advice in a way that increases risk to the resident.
58
57
Common examples are residents who eat sweets despite diabetes, refuse baths
or medication, 59 smoke, 60 or insist on self-care even though staff assistance is
available.6' In this scenario, the negotiated risk agreement "describes a process by
which a resident who engages in risky practices, as identified by a staff member,
family member, or health care provider, signs an agreement whereby he or she
indicates understanding of risks and agrees to accept responsibility for negative
results.,

62

55. Id. (emphasis in original).
56. Id. at 20-21.
57. E.g., KATHERINE BLANCHETTE, 3 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STATE LONG-TERM CARE SYSTEMS:

SUPPORTIVE HOUSING 19 (1997); BURGESS, supra note 31, at 56 (advocating the use of negotiated risk
agreements for "[d]ietary deviations beyond simply food preferences, such as where medical issues like
diabetes are implicated"); JANET O'KEEFFE ET AL., USING MEDICAID TO COVER SERVICES FOR
ELDERLY PERSONS IN RESIDENTIAL CARE SETTINGS: STATE POLICY MAKER AND STAKEHOLDER VIEWS
IN SIX STATES 27 (2003); Paula C. Carder & Mauro Hernandez, Consumer Discoursein Assisted Living,
59B JOURNALS OF GERONTOLOGY: SOC. SCl. S58, S61 (2004); Carder, supra note 12, at 278-79;

Marshall B. Kapp & Keren Brown Wilson, Assisted Living and Negotiated Risk: Reconciling Protection
and Autonomy, 1 J. ETHICS, L. & AGING 5, 11-12 (1995) (describing an insulin-dependent diabetic who
wishes to eat sweets); David Peete, "Risk Management": Heeding the New Mantra, 50 NURSING
HOMES: LONG TERM MGMT. 56, 56 (2001) (recommending "honest dialogue" between providers and
residents about negotiated risk agreements that are used for residents not willing to follow a prescribed
diet).
58. BURGESS, supra note 31, at 56; Lynch & Teachworth, supra note 28, at 4.
59. Carder & Hemandez, supra note 57, at S61.
60. NATALIE M. DUVAL & CHARLES MOSLEY, NEGOTIATED RISK AGREEMENTS IN LONG-TERM
CARE SUPPORT SERVICES 13 (2001); Carder & Hemandez, supra note 57, at S61; Michael E. Anderson,

Contract Negotiations: 10 Tips to Consider Before Signing a Residency Agreement, ASSISTED LIVING
TODAY, July/Aug. 2004, at 69, 71.
61. Robert L. Mollica, State Policy and Regulations, in ASSISTED LIVING: NEEDS, PRACTICES, AND
POLICIES IN RESIDENTIAL CARE FOR THE ELDERLY 9, 22 (Sheryl Zimmerman et al. eds., 2001);
MOLLICA & SNOW, supra note 22, at 28-29; BURGESS, supra note 3 1, at 16-19.
62. Carder, supra note 12, at 278.
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A good demonstration of this change of course is found in a "Quality
Initiative" released in 1998 by an ad hoc group, entitled the Assisted Living Quality
Coalition.63 The relevant section of the Initiative, entitled "Implementing Resident
Autonomy Through Risk Agreements," includes elements of both the "againstfacility-advice" and "inadequate care" scenarios. The "against-facility-advice"
scenario is invoked explicitly by the explanation that a risk agreement is used when
"a resident decides to pursue an action(s) or refuse service(s) (including healthcare
services) that may involve increased risk of personal harm and conflict with a
provider's usual responsibilities .... 64
On the other hand, the "inadequate care" scenario is suggested obliquely and
confusingly, through a requirement that a resident "engage in a risk agreement and.
. secure needed additional services in a manner acceptable to the facility that does
not violate any other applicable laws to remain in the current setting when a
transfer has been recommended to obtain additional services., 65 In a similar vein,
the Initiative acknowledges a resident's right to forego:
[A] recommended transfer to obtain additional services as long as the
resident contracts for or secures the needed additional services in a
nature acceptable to the facility and engages in a risk agreement with the
to resident and the setting and does not
setting which is acceptable
66
violate any applicable law.

63. See

ASSISTED LIVING QUALITY COALITION, ASSISTED LIVING QUALITY INITIATIVE: BUILDING

app. B at 80-82 (1998) (discussing providers' recognition of a
resident's autonomy to make decisions regarding personal actions and lifestyle, provided that no
presumption of provider fault exists ifa resident is harmed because of that resident's personal decision).
64. Id. at app. B at 81. Negotiated risk agreements are described in an earlier part of this report as a
means of"govem[ing] behaviors that residents choose against a provider's advice." Id. at 30.
65. Id. at app. B at 81.
66. Id. at app. B at 76.
A STRUCTURE THAT PROMOTES QUALITY
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In arguments based on the "against-facility-advice" scenario, negotiated risk
generally is justified by a withering portrayal of life in a nursing home.67 Allegedly,
nursing homes follow a prescriptive medical model, whereas assisted living
facilities follow a more humanistic social model of care. 68 In the medical model,
allegedly, decisions are made by the health care professionals, and the resident or
patient has no choice but to comply. 69 One article flatly states, "[i]n a70 nursing
facility, [a diabetic resident] would not be given the option of eating cake.,
As relevant to negotiated risk, the medical model allegedly is noteworthy for
the infantilization of those it serves. A negotiated risk policy paper asserts
"widespread recognition that in the past, protective provider conduct justified under
beneficence to
the traditional protective paradigm often has proceeded beyond
71
manifestations of intrusive and restrictive forms of paternalism.

One critique of traditional nursing home care, in a paper prepared initially for
an ALFA-convened conference, bemoaned the "loss of rights and
'institutionalized' status [that] occurs when vulnerable people are subject to farreaching, professionally-controlled plans for care, and when their lives are
dominated by restrictive rules or lived out in socially impoverished
environments." 72 The same paper criticized "the current trend for guidelines and
standardized care protocols," suggesting that facilities follow "[a] protocol for

67. Carder, supra note 12, at 271 tbl.10.1. Carder notes a "distancing" process in which assisted
living proponents define assisted living facilities, in large part, through facilities' supposed differences
from nursing homes:
Proponents assert that [assisted living facilities] differ from new nursing home facilities and
make comparisons when explaining what assisted living is. Nursing facilities are
institutional, hospital-like settings that do not respect the individual's need for independence,
dignity, and choice. In contrast, [assisted living facilities] provide home-like environments
where respect for the "resident's" independence, dignity, and choice are the primary
concerns.
Id.
68. See BURGESS, supra note 31, at 14-15 ("[T]he recognition of assisted living as a 'social model'
of care and services, versus nursing facilities as a 'medical model,' has led to both the development and
the preservation of these two distinct settings, where, on the one hand (nursing facilities) resident safety
is the paramount concern, often to the exclusion of certain 'social' attributes like resident autonomy and,
on the other (assisted living), resident safety is viewed as a primary function but is balanced against and
promoted within the context of equally-important social values, like resident choice."); Carder, supra
note 12, at 266.
69. See BURGESS, supra note 31, at 14-15, n.9 (explaining that "true risk taking" is limited in
"skilled nursing facilities, hospitals and other institutional settings").
70. Carder, supra note 12, at 278.
71. Kapp & Wilson, supra note 57, at 7.
72. Rosalie A. Kane & Keren Brown Wilson, Assisted Living at the Crossroads:Principlesfor Its
Future, INDEPENDENT LIVING RESEARCH UTILIZATION, Sept. 21, 2001, http://www.ilru.org/html/
training/webcasts/handouts/2002/10-09-JK/crossroads.html.
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when people should get in and out of bed and how they should spend their waking
hours .... ",73
VI.

STATE NEGOTIATED RISK LAWS ARE AMBIGUOUS AND INCONSISTENT

State law has been tangled by the increasing unwillingness of assisted living
proponents to own up to the "inadequate care" scenario. Instead, proponents
generally base their arguments on the "against-facility-advice" scenario, but
propose negotiated risk laws that could be used to justify negotiated risk in the
"inadequate care" scenario.
Currently, references to "negotiated risk," "managed risk," "shared
responsibility," "bounded choice," "risk agreement," or "compliance agreement"
appear in the assisted living laws of at least fifteen states, including the District of
Columbia. Also, Utah has created a standard form for a "Negotiated Risk
Contract." The common denominator in these states' laws or procedures is the
sanctioning or authorizing of a written assisted living agreement that in some way
74
discusses risk.

73. Id. at 29.
74. A recurring question about negotiated risk is how it differs from the care planning that occurs
routinely in assisted living facilities and other long-term care facilities. See BURGESS, supra note 31, at
51 ("[T]he fact that risk agreements, appropriately used, are limited to requested behaviors or activities
outside those a community would normally allow suggests that they are not synonymous with service
plans."). As this article discusses subsequently, confusion on this point is caused in great part by
ambiguous state statutory and regulatory language that speaks of agreements and signatures, but in the
context of issues that generally are determined through care planning processes. See infra Part VIA-H.
For the purposes of this article, a negotiatedrisk agreement is distinguished from a care plan by whether
a written signed document is required and, even if a signature is not required explicitly, whether a
document is described in a way that suggests an enforceable contract. In general, a negotiated risk
agreement is suggested by references to a contract, an agreement, or risk. Also, risk is likely to be the
sole topic of a negotiated risk agreement whereas, in a care plan, risk will be only one of multiple topics
addressed.
Alaska's "assisted living plan," for example, is not recognized under these definitions as a
negotiated risk agreement, even though the law discusses a resident's right to evaluate risks and make
choices, along with a facility's right to accept or reject a resident's choices regarding risks. See ALASKA
STAT. § 47.33.230(a)(2)-(3) (2006) (instructing that an assisted living plan must recognize the "right of
the resident . . . to evaluate and choose, after discussion with all relevant parties ... the risks associated
with each option when making decisions pertaining to the resident's abilities, preferences, and service
needs"). Alaska's assisted living plan appears to be a care plan because it refers to an assisted living
"plan" rather than a contract or agreement. Alaska's law does not mention signatures or agreements, and
the plan is to be developed by the resident or resident's representative with participation from facility
staff. Id. § 47.33.220; see also id. § 47.22.230(d) ("A resident's assisted living plan must be in writing,
in language that can be understood by the resident."). Finally, the assisted living plan must "identify and
describe" a myriad of issues with little relationship to risk, such as "the resident's preference in
roommates, living environment, food, recreational activities, religious affiliation, and relationships and
visitation with friends, family members, and others." Id. § 47.22.230(b)(3). See JENKENS ET AL., supra
note 3, at 5 ("Alaska requires a discussion of risks as part of service planning.").
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Beyond this common denominator, generalizing about negotiated risk is a
precarious proposition. The concept of negotiated risk differs greatly from state to
state and, within a state, often presses together two or more inconsistent concepts.
The difficulty in categorizing these concepts demonstrates the muddled status
quo of state negotiated risk law:
Concept of Negotiated Risk
Resolving Disputes with Emphasis on
Resident's Acceptance of Risk
Care Planning with Emphasis on Resident's
Acceptance of Risk
Care Planning with Limited References to
Acceptance of Risk
Care Planning to Reduce Probability of
Negative Outcome
Consenting to Inadequate or Insufficient Care
Ambiguity as to Whether Agreements Are
Used to Resolve Disputes, or to Consent to
Inadequate or Insufficient Care
Signed Statement of Facility's Risk Policy
Waiver of Liability Forbidden or Disclaimed

State(s)
District of
Columbia
Kansas
Kansas
Florida
Ilois
Utah
Oregon
Hawaii
Oklahoma
Ohio
Wisconsin
Arkansas
Iowa
Washington
Delaware
ewJre
New Jersey
Vermont

Each of these categories and states is discussed below.
A.

Resolving Disputes with Emphasis on Resident's Acceptance ofRisk

In the District of Columbia and Kansas, the relevant laws refer to agreements
that protect a resident's autonomy when the resident and facility disagree.75 On their
face, the laws appear predicated on the "against-facility-advice" scenario.
In general, the statutory or regulatory language itself does not indicate
whether the provisions are fair to residents. A high-level outline of these laws is:
1) The resident and the facility disagree;

75. See supra Part V.
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2) The resident's autonomy deserves protection, as do the facility's
interests;
3) The facility must put the resident on notice of the dispute; and
4) The resident and facility must negotiate and sign an agreement that
sets forth each party's respective responsibilities.
The unanswered question is: what are the terms of the agreement? The
agreement might memorialize a fair negotiated settlement. On the other hand, the
agreement might serve primarily to release the facility from responsibility.
Significantly, state laws frequently use terms such as "shared responsibility" that
bring to mind images of fairness but could also cover an agreement that shifts
liability to the resident.
1.

District of Columbia

District of Columbia law provides for "shared responsibility agreements" to
resolve disagreements between a resident and facility regarding "lifestyle, personal
behavior, safety, and service plans.

76

On their face, the relevant definitions

describe a process respectful of residents' interests. "Shared responsibility" is
defined as "a process by which the resident . . . and the [assisted living facility]
arrive at an acceptable balance between the resident's desire for independence and
the facility's legitimate concerns for safety, where there is a disagreement." 77 In
turn, a "shared responsibility agreement" is defined as an agreement that outlines
the parties' responsibilities.78
The District of Columbia statute is noticeably slippery about whether such a
shared responsibility agreement is a care planning document or a waiver of
liability. In one breath, the statute identifies a shared responsibility agreement as "a
tool for [assisted living facilities] to recognize an individual resident's right to
autonomy by respecting his or her right to make individual decisions regarding
lifestyle, personal behavior, and [individualized service plans]., 79 The following
sentence, however, suggests that the purpose of a shared responsibility agreement is
to shift risk from facility to resident, stating that "a resident's decision may involve
increased risk of personal harm and therefore potentially increase the risk of
liability by the [facility] absent an agreement between the resident and [the facility]
80
concerning such decisions or actions."

76. D.C. CODE § 44-106.05(a) (2001).
77. Id. § 44-102.01(21). In language not included in this article, the statute recognizes the resident's
interest may be represented by a representative. See id. ("The purpose of 'shared responsibility' is to
provide complete information to the resident and the surrogate so that the parties can arrive at an
informed agreement of which services are to be provided .
.
78. Id. § 44-102.01(22).
79. Id. § 44-106.05(b); Id. § 44-102.01(14) (defining ISPs, or Individualized Service Plans).
80. Id. § 44-106.05(b).
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Use of a shared responsibility agreement is required when "a resident decides
to pursue a course of action, such as refusal of services, that may involve increased
risk of personal harm and conflict with the [assisted living facility's] usual
responsibilities." 8' The facility must explain to the resident the range of issues
subject to negotiation, and then "[n]egotiate a shared responsibility agreement, with
82
the resident as a full partner.,
The law gives a resident the right to enter into a shared responsibility
agreement.83 However, as discussed above, it is unclear whether a shared
responsibility agreement benefits the resident or the facility. A resident's right to
refuse services is conditioned on the signing of a shared responsibility agreement.84
2.

Kansas

In most respects, the Kansas "negotiated service agreement" is nothing more
than a written care plan that arguably is not negotiated at all. 85 These "agreements"
are developed by assisted living facilities, "in collaboration" with a resident or
resident's representative.86 The agreement describes needed services, and identifies
who will be providing and paying for those services.87
The concept of risk enters the negotiated service agreement when a resident
or resident's representative refuses a service that is necessary for the resident's
health or safety, in the opinion of the facility operator or nurse, or in the opinion of
the resident's physician or case manager. In this case, a negotiated service
agreement must identify the refused service and the negative consequences of

81. Id. § 44-106.05(c).
82. Id. § 44-106.05(c)(1)-(2).
83. Id. § 44-105.04(4).
84. Id. § 44-105.4(5). The requirement of a shared responsibility agreement is qualified by need: a
resident has the right "[t]o refuse to participate in any service once the potential consequences of such
participation have been explained and a shared responsibility agreement has been reached, if necessary,
between the resident ... and the [assisted living facility]." Id. (emphasis added); see also id. § 44106.04(a)(6) (explaining that an Individualized Service Plan "shall include a shared responsibility
agreement when necessary"). The issue, of course, is who determines when an agreement is needed, and
under what standard. As a practical matter, the decision is most likely made by an assisted living facility,
and a shared responsibility agreement will be "needed" when a facility demands that such an agreement
be signed.
85. See JENKENS, supra note 3, at 45 n.14 (explaining that Kansas was not included in this
particular negotiated risk report because "its regulations pertain only to negotiated service agreements
and reference only the risk of refusing a recommended service") (emphasis in original).
86. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 28-39-244(a) (2006). The statute provides that "[e]ach individual
involved in the development of the negotiated service agreement shall sign the agreement." Id. § 28-39244(h). In most cases, evidently, a resident or a resident's representative will not sign such an
agreement, because the agreement will have been developed by the facility's staff.
87. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 28-39-244(a)(1)-(3) (2006).
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refusing that service, as well as "acceptance by the resident or the resident's legal
88
representative of the potential risk.,
B.
1.

CarePlanningwith Emphasis on Resident's Acceptance of Risk
Florida

Florida law defines both "managed risk" and "shared responsibility" in its
statutory assisted living law. "Managed risk" describes care planning done "in such
a way that the consequences of a decision, including any inherent risk, are
explained to all parties and reviewed periodically ....89
The Florida law's related definition of "shared responsibility" follows this
concept, but then changes direction. The first half of the definition, consistent with
the "managed risk" definition, mentions risk obliquely: "'Shared responsibility'
means exploring the options available to a resident within a facility and the risks
involved with each option ..... 90 The second half of the definition, however, gives
no hint of risk or compromise, indicating that the process of exploring options
"enabl[es] the resident and, if applicable, the resident's representative ...... ,and
the facility to develop a service plan which best meets the resident's needs and
seeks to improve the resident's quality of life." 9'
The Florida law is much more verbose in defining these terms than in using
them, mentioning the terms only once and requiring that "the concept of managed
risk" be implemented in those facilities licensed to provide nursing services. 92 A
corresponding Florida regulation describes, among other things, service plans at
such facilities and shifts the focus away from meeting the resident's needs and
improving the quality of life, towards the idea that the resident is accepting risk.93
2.

Illinois

Illinois' version of negotiated risk is wrapped in the language of autonomy
and flexibility. Introductory statutory language lists "the right to negotiated risk" as
a central assisted living principle, along with "dignity, individuality, privacy,

88. Id. § 28-39-244(f)(i)-(3).
89. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 429.02(15) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007).

90. Id. § 429.02(23).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 429.07(b)(3)(f)-(g) (referencing the Nurse Practice Act, § 464.001 (West 2001) (effective
July 1, 2000), and indicating that managed risk is only implemented when "services of a person licensed
pursuant to part I of chapter 464" are provided). Specifically, this requirement applies only to those
facilities licensed to provide "extended congregate care." Id. § 429.07(b)(3). Such facilities are
authorized to provide nursing services and certain supportive services "to persons who otherwise would
be disqualified from continued residence in a[n] [assisted living] facility." Id. § 429.07(b).
93. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 58A-5.030(7)(c) (2007).
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independence, autonomy, and decision-making ability. '94 The introductory
language further posits "that "there is an acceptable balance between consumer
protection and resident willingness to accept risk and . . . most consumers are
competent to make their own judgments about the services they are obtaining. 9 5
"Negotiated risk" is defined as "the process by which a resident . . . may
formally negotiate with providers what risks each are willing and unwilling to
assume in service provision and the resident's living environment., 96 A provider is
responsible for informing residents of risks and the consequences of assuming
those risks.97 A resident has the right to refuse services, provided that he or she has
received clear information regarding risks and benefits.98 The definition of a
"negotiated risk agreement," by contrast, sharpens focus onto the agreement's
enforceability and the possibility of harm. The relevant regulation describes these
agreements as "binding" and specifies that they "describ[e] conditions or situations
that could put the resident at risk of harm or injury." 99
Under Illinois law, a negotiated risk agreement cannot waive any assisted
living regulation. This limitation would appear to prevent a facility from using a
negotiated risk agreement to authorize an inadequate level of care. 00 Among the
non-waivable regulations is a prohibition against an assisted living facility's
admission or retention of a resident if the facility cannot provide adequate care.'l0
3.

Utah

Utah is the one state that most directly links the concept of negotiated risk to
waiver of a facility's liability. Although Utah law does not address negotiated risk
or any related concepts, the state's Bureau of Health Facility Licensing,
Certification, and Resident Assessment has created a form for Negotiated Risk
Contracts. In these contracts, a resident's "responsible party" must recognize that
the resident has had "difficulty" in certain specified ways, and must authorize the
facility to allow the resident to continue the behavior in question, as well as release
the facility from liability with regard to such behavior. Both the responsible party
02
and a facility representative must sign this contract.1

94. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 9/5 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77,
§ 295.100(a) (2007).
95. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 9/5; ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 295.100(a).
96. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 9/10; ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 295.200.
97. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 9/10; ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 295.200.
98. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 295.4010(i).
99. Id. § 295.200.
100. See id. § 295.2070(e).
101. Id. § 295.2000(a).
102. UTAH BUREAU OF HEALTH FACILITY LICENSING, supra note 5; see also Mary Jane Ciecarello
& Joanne Wetzler, Assisted Living in Utah: A Brief Overview for Consumers, 19 UTAH B.J. 24, 26
(2006) (noting that negotiated risk agreements are "commonly used" in Utah).
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C.
1.

CarePlanningwith Limited References to Acceptance of Risk

Oregon

In Oregon, "negotiated risk"-"managed risk" in Oregon law-hews closely
to a care-planning model. "Managed risk" is "a process by which a resident's highrisk behavior or choices are reviewed with the resident."' 0 3 The facility explains the
resident's options and consequences, and then the managed risk plan documents the
resident's decision either to accept the consequences of current behavior or change
behavior' °4 Specifically, the managed risk plan must include an explanation of the
"cause of concern," as well as "possible negative consequences," a description of
the resident's preferences, possible alternatives, "[a] description of the services the
facility will provide to accommodate the resident's choice or minimize the potential
0 5
risk," and the final agreement reached between the resident and the facility.
D.
1.

Care Planningto Reduce Probabilityof Negative Outcome

Hawaii

In Hawaii, negotiated risk is best described as a mechanism for reducing a
resident's risk. However, as is typical in negotiated risk law, such a simple
summary is dangerous, and must be qualified by the recognition that relevant
Hawaii law is both vague and internally inconsistent.
Under Hawaii law, the relevant term is "managed risk." Although Hawaii
statutory law makes no mention of the term, it receives a prominent position in the
state's assisted living regulations. The initial paragraph of these regulations lists
three principles that are to be applied to the regulations: aging in place, negotiated
plan of care, and managed risk.10 6 The subsequent regulations, however, do little to
distinguish "managed risk" from the "negotiated plan of care." The definition of
"managed risk" describes a "formal process of negotiating and developing a plan to
address resident needs, decisions, or preferences to reduce the probabilityof a poor
outcome for the resident or of putting others at riskfor adverse consequences."' 7

103. OR. ADMIN. R. 411-055-0000(24) (2006) (defining as applicable to residential care facilities);
id. 411-056-0005(20) (defining as applicable to assisted living facilities). As illustrated by these parallel
provisions, the concept of "managed risk" applies both in residential care facilities and assisted living
facilities. Assisted living facilities must offer private living units, but residential care facilities may have
shared occupancy. OR. REV. STAT. § 443.400(5) (defining "residential care facility").
104. OR. ADMIN. R. 411-055-0000(24) (defining as applicable to residential care facilities); id. 411056-0005(20) (defining as applicable to assisted living facilities).
105. Id. 411-055-01800) (defining as applicable to residential care facilities); id. 411-056-00150)
(defining as applicable to assisted living facilities).
106. HAW. CODER. § 11-90-1(1)-(3) (Weil 1999).
107. Id. § 11-90-2 (emphasis added). The same regulation explains that:
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Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of this definition is its twist on risk-the only
to the relatively unlikely scenario
mention of "risk" pertains not to the resident, but
10 8
resident.
another
harming
plan
resident's
of the
2.

Oklahoma

Oklahoma law is comparatively succinct. The relevant provision applies when
"a resident's preference or decision places the resident or others at risk or is likely
to lead to an adverse consequence."' 0 9 Under this law, assisted living facilities are
instructed to discuss these matters with residents or residents' representatives, and
to "attempt to negotiate a written agreement that minimizes risk and adverse
consequences and offers alternatives while respecting resident preferences." 1"0
E.
1.

Consentingto Inadequate Care

References to "Consequences" or "Responsibility"

A small minority of states present negotiated risk as a mechanism by which a
resident might consent to receiving inadequate care. Generally, liability is not
addressed directly; instead, these state laws speak with less precision of, for
example, "consequences" or "sharing responsibility." These laws are similarly
ambiguous as to whether the refused service otherwise would be available.
Ohio is the only state in which consent to inadequate care is presented as the
primary purpose of-to use Ohio's terminology-a "risk agreement." In Wisconsin
and Arkansas, by contrast, such consent is one purpose of negotiated risk; the other
purpose is the resolution of disputes.'1 '
2.

Ohio

Ohio law refers to written "risk agreements," in which a resident and facility
"agree to share responsibility for making and implementing decisions affecting the
scope and quantity of services provided by the facility to the resident."' 1 2 By
requiring that the facility "identify the risks inherent in a decision ... not to receive

"Negotiated Plan of Care or Service Plan or Agreement" means a written plan for services
developed with the resident or significant others and which includes a recognition of the

resident's capabilities and choices. The plan defines the division of responsibility in the
implementation of services and specifies measurable goals.
Id.
108. Id.
109. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 310:663-3-6(a) (2007).

110. Id. § 310:663-3-6(b).
11. See infra Part VI.F.
112. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.012 (LexisNexis 2005); see also OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3701:1757(E) (2006) (outlining the same provision).
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a service provided by the facility,"' 1 3 the law suggests that a resident might be
refusing an available service, although the definition of "risk agreement" is
expansive enough to include the "inadequate care" scenario.
As a practical matter, a resident has little reason to refuse an available service,
and therefore the most likely use of a risk agreement would be to acknowledge a
service's unavailability. This observation is reinforced by the only other Ohio
statutory provision that mentions risk agreements, which presupposes that a facility
that uses risk agreements has a policy of doing so, and requires that such a facility
notify prospective residents and their representatives of that policy. 114
A formal policy of this type could make little sense when applied to residents
refusing available services. Residents generally have no reason to refuse needed
services. Furthermore, such a policy likely could say nothing meaningful. The
policy would say that the resident has a right to refuse services unless the refusal
threatens the health and safety of others." 5 Beyond that, the policy could say little
else, because the facility could not anticipate the various situations in which a
resident might refuse available services. Envisioning a formal policy becomes
plausible, however, if the policy would relate to an "inadequate care" scenario. In
that situation, a facility clearly would have an interest in delineating the extent of
its responsibilities.
The Ohio regulation that governs personal care services contemplates that a
risk agreement might pertain to a resident either refusing available services or
acknowledging the unavailability of needed services. A refusal of available services
is discussed in the regulation's subsection requiring a facility to provide necessary
personal care services, except when the resident and facility have entered into a risk
agreement. 16 If, however, a resident requires personal care services that the facility
does not provide, the regulation presents three options: (1) the facility or the
resident can arrange for the services to be provided; (2) the resident can be
transferred; or (3) the facility and the resident can enter into a risk agreement." 7

113. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.012 (emphasis added).
114. Id. § 3721.19(B); see also OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3701:17-57(F) (outlining a similar provision).
115. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3721.16(A)(i)(c)-(d) (LexisNexis 2005) (noting that
involuntary transfer or discharge is authorized when "[a]n emergency arises in which the safety [or
health] of individuals in the [facility] is endangered").
116. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3701:17-59(B)(2).
117. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3701:17-59(C). The option of entering into a risk agreement is only open
to those facilities with a policy of using such agreements. Id. § 3701:17-59(C)(2). Ohio regulations are
inconsistent as to whether a facility may admit or retain a resident for whom it cannot provide adequate
care. As discussed in this article, such admission or retention is allowed through the mechanism of risk
agreements. However, Ohio regulations instruct more generally that a facility "shall not admit an
individual who requires services or accommodations . . . beyond that which the specific facility
provides." Id. § 3701:17-57(A).
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Ambiguity Whether Agreements Are Used to Resolve Disputes,
or to Consent to Inadequate Care
Wisconsin

Wisconsin law requires facilities to "[e]stablish, with each resident . . . a

signed, negotiated risk agreement that identifies situations that could put the
resident at risk and for which the resident understands and accepts
responsibility." ' 1 8 The risk agreement is indeed mandatory-a resident's refusal to
sign or revise a risk agreement can justify his or her involuntary transfer or
discharge.ll 9 "Risk agreement" is defined in the relevant Wisconsin regulation as "a
binding stipulation identifying conditions or situations which could put the tenant at
risk of harm or injury and the tenant's preference for how those conditions or
situations are to be handled.' 120 Neither resident nor facility is to "refuse to accept
' 12 1
reasonable risk or insist that the other party accept unreasonable risk."
The regulations refer to both the "against-facility-advice" scenario and the
"inadequate care" scenario. The "against-facility-advice" scenario is addressed by
the requirement that a risk agreement list any resident action, completed or
contemplated, that is "contrary to the practice or advice of the facility and which
could put the tenant at risk of harm or injury." 122 Relevant to the "inadequate care"
scenario, a risk agreement must list "[a]ny needs identified in the comprehensive
assessment which will not be provided for by the facility, either directly or under
contract."' 123 Under either scenario, "[a] risk agreement may not waive any [assisted
living regulation] or any other right of the [resident].', 124 This no-waiver rule may
be less restrictive to facilities than it appears to be on its face. The rights that matter
most to a resident are those pertaining to quality of care and, according to the
relevant regulations, those rights can vary with the terms of the resident's service
agreement. 12 5 Thus to a certain extent, the legal right of a resident is not to adequate
care, but to the care identified in the service agreement.
The qualifier "to a certain extent" is important because Wisconsin, like other
states discussed in this article, takes inconsistent positions: the state both provides
for the enforceability of risk agreements, and requires that care be adequate to meet

118. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 50.034(3)(d) (West 2003); see also Wis. ADMIN. CODE [HFS] § 89.23(3)(e)
(2006) ("Services shall be provided in a manner which respects tenant privacy, enhances tenant selfreliance and supports tenant autonomy in decision-making, including the right to accept risk." (emphasis
added)).
119. WIs. ADMIN. CODE [HFS] § 89.29(3)(a)(8).
120. Id. § 89.13(27).
121. Id. § 89.28(4).
122. Id. § 89.28(2)(a)(1).
123. Id. § 89.28(2)(b).
124. Id. § 89.28(3).
125. See, e.g., id. §§ 89.23(1), (2)(a)(3), (3)(b).
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residents' needs. The portion of the Wisconsin regulation entitled "Services"
declares that "[a] facility is not required to provide or be staffed to provide services
which are not needed, are not included in the service agreements or are above the
minimum required levels," but another subsection of that same regulation requires
that a facility be "able to provide the minimum required services to any [resident]
,126
who needs or develops a need for those services.
2.

Arkansas

Arkansas law is equally evasive as to whether negotiated risk applies to the
"against-facility-advice" scenario, the "inadequate care" scenario, or both. The term
used in Arkansas regulations is "compliance agreement," which is defined as "the
written formal plan developed in consideration of shared responsibility, choice and
assisted living values and negotiated between the resident . . . and the assisted
living facility to avoid or reduce the risk of adverse outcomes that may occur in an
assisted living environment."' 127 Neither "shared responsibility" nor "assisted living
values" are defined or even mentioned further in the regulations; "choice" is
defined in a manner that is roughly consistent with its dictionary definition, but
incorporates references to "resident options," "care planning," and other assisted
28
living concepts. 1
Arkansas's "compliance agreement" regulation alternates confusingly
between discussing a facility's limitations in admitting or retaining residents, and
explaining compliance agreements as a mechanism for honoring residents' choices.
The regulation's pivotal sentence sets limits on residents' choices:
The choice and independence of action of a resident may need to be
limited when a resident's individual choice, preference, or actions, are
identified as placing the resident or others at risk, lead to adverse
or the majority
outcomes, or violate the norms of the facility or program
29
of the residents, or any combination of these events.1
A compliance agreement is intended to "minimize the possible risk and
3°
adverse consequences while still respecting the resident's preferences.'
Involuntary transfers or discharges are authorized for failing to comply with risk
126. Id. §§ 89.23(2)(a)(1), (2)(a)(5).
127. 016-06-001 ARK. CODE R. § 300 (Weil 2005) (effective Aug. 1, 2003) (defining as applicable
to Level I facilities); 016-06-002 ARK. CODE R. § 300 (Weil 2005) (effective Aug. 1, 2002) (defining as
applicable to Level II facilities). The primary difference between a Level I facility and a Level II facility
is that a Level II facility may admit and retain residents who need a nursing home level of care. Id.
§ 400.2. The law for Level I facilities and Level II facilities regarding compliance agreements, however,
is almost identical. 016-06-001 ARK. CODE R. § 300 (Weil 2005).
128. Id. § 300.
129. Id. § 704.
130. Id. The Arkansas regulations suggest, for example, the use of a compliance agreement when a
facility feels that a resident may be at risk if he or she is given a key, a code, or another other exit device
for leaving the facility. See, e.g., id. § 904(b)(1).

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 10:287

agreements or, as is the case in Wisconsin, refusing to negotiate or revise such
agreements.' 31 Arkansas's compliance agreement provisions are flanked by two
provisions addressing facilities' levels of care: (1) a list of the health care
conditions that cannot be accommodated in that level of assisted living facility, and
(2) an admonition that an individual is prohibited from residing in an assisted living
facility if he or she needs around-the-clock nursing care or requires services that, by
law, cannot be provided in an assisted living facility.' 32 Significantly, this
prohibition applies even if a resident is willing to waive the facility's liability. 33
Overall, the law's structure-the flanking of the negotiated risk provisions by
provisions relating to facilities' admission and retention limitations-suggests that
negotiated risk also relates to facilities' abilities-or inabilities-to care for
residents with particular care needs.
G. Signed Statement of Facility'sRisk Policy
1.

Iowa

Iowa law is particularly ambiguous regarding the concept of "shared risk,"
even though this concept is purportedly a central feature of assisted living under the
relevant state regulations. The definition of assisted living encourages resident
decision-making and indicates that decisions should emphasize shared risk as well
134
as choice, dignity, privacy, individuality, and independence.
Under Iowa law, the most tangible manifestation of shared risk is a
requirement that an incoming resident sign the facility's "managed risk policy
disclosure statement."'' 35 This statement is defined vaguely as a "signed
acknowledgment of the shared responsibility for identifying and meeting the needs
of the tenant and the process for managing risk and upholding tenant autonomy
when tenant decision making may result in poor outcomes for the tenant or
36
others."1

131. Id. §§ 602.1(g), 704(7); see WIS. ADMIN. CODE [HFS] § 89.29(3)(a)(8) (2006).
132. 016-06-001 ARK. CODE R. § 704 (Weil 2005) (effective Aug. 1, 2003) (defining as applicable
to Level I facilities); 016-06-002 ARK. CODE R. § 704 (Weil 2005) (effective Aug. 1, 2002) (defining as
applicable to Level II facilities).
133. Id. §§ 601.4, 704; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-10-1704(c)(2) (2005).
134. IOWA CODE ANN. § 231 C.2(2) (West 2006); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 321-25.1 (2007).
135. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 321-25.22(l).

136. Id. 321-25.36; see also id. 321-25.4(11) (noting that, in a certification application, a facility
must submit "[t]he current policy and procedure for managing risk and upholding [resident] autonomy
when [resident] decision making may result in poor outcomes for the [resident] or others").
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H.

Waiver of Liability Explicitly Forbiddenor Disclaimed

Yet again, generalization is difficult. Although Washington, Delaware, New
Jersey, and Vermont do not allow negotiated risk to waive a facility's liability,
these states' laws differ in many ways. In Washington, the negotiated risk process
closely resembles care planning. In Delaware and New Jersey, by contrast,
negotiated risk ("managed risk" in New Jersey) is an internally inconsistent
combination of dispute resolution and risk assumption. Finally, Vermont is an
exception-in a positive way-the relevant law succinctly sets out a disputeresolution focus, and specifies that negotiated risk does not include waiver of a
facility's liability.
1.

Washington

Under Washington law, the negotiated risk process closely resembles care
planning. The "negotiated service agreement" draws from assessments and the
initial service plan, and is not an agreement per se. Instead, it is completed by the
facility, with possible involvement from a resident or the resident's
representative. 37

The negotiated service agreement determines the care that is to be provided in
virtually every context, whether the issue is basic services, activities, medication,
nutrition, nursing services, tube feeding, staffing, or safety measures. 3 8 Allusions
to risk are limited and oblique 39 and, in contrast, another regulation explicitly
states that negotiated service agreements may not be used "to waive any rights of
the resident or ...to place' 40responsibility or liability for losses of personal property
or injury on the resident."'

137. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.20.370(1) (West 2005); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE 388-78A2130 (2006); id. 388-78A-2170(1)-(2) (describing that a facility provides services consistent with the
relevant negotiated service agreement). A negotiated service agreement must be signed by a resident or
resident's representative, but the signature requirement appears to be designed to develop a consensus
among persons involved in the resident's care, rather than to create an agreement that is enforceable in
court. The signature requirement applies not only to the facility and the resident, but also to any public
or private case manager for that resident. Id. 388-78A-2150.
138. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 388-78A-2170 (basic services); id. 388-78A-2180 (activities); id. 38878A-2210 (medication); id. 388-78A-2300 (nutrition); id. 388-78A-2320 (nursing services); id. 38878A-2330 (tube feeding); id. 388-78A-2450 (staffing); id. 388-78A-2700 (safety measures).
139. See, e.g., id. 388-78A-2380(4) ("Each resident who is assessed as being unsafe to leave [the
facility] unescorted is able to leave [the facility] consistent with his or her negotiated service
agreement.").
140. Id. 388-78A-2140(8).
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Delaware

Under Delaware law, the definition of a negotiated risk agreement is typically
ambiguous. The agreement is "[a] signed document between the resident and the
facility, and any other involved party, which describes mutually agreeable action
balancing resident choice and independence with the health and safety of the
resident or others."' 141 Delaware law benignly defines "shared responsibility" as
"[t]he concept that residents and assisted living facilities share responsibility for
planning and decision-making affecting the resident."'' 42 A negotiated risk
agreement is appropriate only if risks are "tolerable to all parties" to the agreement,
the agreement provides for "the greatest amount of resident autonomy with the
43
least amount of risk," and the resident is capable of making informed choices.
Under Delaware law, negotiated risk agreements appear designed for dispute
resolution rather than liability waiver. A negotiated risk agreement, in fact, cannot
be used to waive a facility's liability. 144 A related regulation states that a "facility
shall not use managed/negotiated risk agreements to provide care to residents with
needs beyond the capability of the facility."' 145 The agreement must describe the
issue and the choices available to the resident, along with the risks and benefits
associated with each choice, the facility's recommendation, and the resident's
preference. Then, the agreement indicates the agreed-upon option, and in relation to
that option, describes the responsibilities of the resident, the facility, and any
relevant third parties. 46
3.

New Jersey

New Jersey law is roughly comparable to Delaware law-in each state, the
relevant laws are ambiguous stews of dispute resolution concepts and risk
references, clarified by prohibitions against any waivers of facility liability. New
Jersey law suggests that a resident's autonomy and health may be in conflict, and
defines "managed risk" as a "process of balancing resident choice and
independence with the health and safety of the resident and other persons in the

141. 40-300-005 DEL. CODE REGS. § 63.218 (Weil 2007). The Delaware regulations generally refer
to "Managed/Negotiated Risk Agreement[s]" but, for simplicity, this article condenses the term to
"negotiated risk agreements."
142. Id. § 63.229.
143. Id. § 63.1208.
144. Id. § 63.1212.
145. Id. § 63.1211. This same regulation also indicates that "[a] managed/negotiated risk agreement
shall not be used to supersede any requirements of these regulations." Id.
146. Id. § 63.1209; see also 40-800-124 DEL. CODE REGS. § 5.1.3 (noting that the state is obligated
to participate, as appropriate, in the development of negotiated risk agreements, when payment for
assisted living care is provided at least in part through the state's Assisted Living Medicaid Waiver
Program).
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facility or program."' 147 The very next sentence of the regulation, however,
abandons this concept of balancing and explains that "[i]f a resident's preference or
decision places the resident or others at risk or is likely to lead to adverse
consequences, such risks or consequences are discussed with the resident... and a
formal plan to avoid or reduce negative or adverse outcomes is negotiated ....
Similarly, the defined purpose of a "managed risk agreement" in the
149
regulation is "to avoid or reduce the risk of adverse outcomes.', The definition of
a "managed risk agreement" provides that such an agreement is "developed in
consideration of shared responsibility, bounded choice and assisted living
values."' 5 O These definitions are, in part, innocuous, but intimate that a resident is
accepting risk. "Assisted living values" is also defined in the regulation as
including "each resident's choice, dignity, independence, individuality and privacy
in a homelike environment," as well as "aging in place" and-from a resident's
point of view, the only discordant note--"shared responsibility."'' Another term
defined in the regulation, "bounded choice," puts some brakes on the resident's
choice and independence, acknowledging "limits placed on a resident's choice as a
result of an assessment . . . which indicates that such resident's choices or

preferences place the resident or others at a risk of harm or lead to consequences
' 2
which violate the norms of the facility or program or the rights of others.' 5
The regulation's definition of "shared responsibility" similarly combines
conflicting images. The first image is communitarian: "'Shared responsibility'
means that residents

. . . and providers of assisted living services share

53
responsibility for planning and decision making affecting residents."'' This broad
principle is unobjectionable from a resident's point of view, but its suggestion of
communitarianism is reversed by the risk-evoking instruction that follows: "[t]o
participate fully in shared responsibility, residents shall be provided with clear and
information about the possible consequences of their decisionunderstandable
'1 54
making."
A separate New Jersey regulation explains how managed risk agreements are
to be developed. Consistent with "bounded choice," the regulation focuses on how
a resident's autonomy can be limited--"when a resident's individual choice,
preference and/or actions are identified as placing the resident or others at risk, lead
to adverse outcome and/or violate the norms of the facility or program or the

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

N.J. ADMIN. CODE
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 8:36-1.3

(2007).
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majority of the residents."' 55 The agreement is intended to "minimize the possible
risk and adverse consequences while still respecting the resident's preferences,"
although the regulation recognizes that in some instances the facility and the
56
resident or the resident's representative will not be able to reach agreement.'
Although the New Jersey regulations leave open the possibility that a
managed risk agreement could waive or reduce a facility's liability, that possibility
is foreclosed by a New Jersey statute. A provision applicable both to assisted living
facilities and nursing homes voids "[a]ny provision or clause waiving or limiting
the right to sue for negligence or malpractice in any admission agreement or
57
contract."1
4.

Vermont

Compared to the other state laws discussed in this article, Vermont's
definition of negotiated risk is notably lucid. Vermont law addresses the waiver of
liability issue explicitly, providing that "[n]egotiated risk does not constitute a
waiver of liability."'5 8 Additionally, "negotiated risk" is defined in a relatively
straightforward manner as "a formal, mutually-agreed upon, written understanding
that results after balancing a resident's choices and capabilities with the possibility
' 59
that those choices will place the resident at risk of harm."'
If a resident has entered into an applicable negotiated risk agreement, she
cannot be discharged involuntarily for being a danger to herself' 60 However, it is
unclear how meaningful this protection might be in practice. For example, a
diabetic would be allowed to eat candy, but as discussed subsequently, such
individual choices are allowed routinely in long-term care without need for
negotiated risk.' 6' Also, negotiated risk does not provide an exception to an
involuntary discharge based on a facility's inability to meet a resident's care
needs. 162 Even less likely is the probability, as suggested by the Vermont
regulations, that a negotiated risk agreement might eliminate the need for an
1 63
involuntary discharge predicated on "a serious threat to residents or staff.',
Obviously, a resident signing the negotiated risk agreement has no ability to
consent to risk on others' behalf.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. § 8:36-4.17(a).
Id. § 8:36-4.17(a)(3), (4).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:13-8.1 (West Supp. 2006).
13-110-007 VT. CODE R. § 3.4 (2006).
Id.
Id. § 6.5(a).
See infra Part VII.lA.
13-110-007 VT. CODE R. § 6.5(f).
Id.
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I.

State Law Overall

This analysis illustrates that state-negotiated risk law is generally ambiguous
and inconsistent, whether viewed solely within a single state, or viewed across
several or all of the sixteen states that explicitly recognize negotiated risk. This
ambiguity is demonstrated, for example, by ubiquitous, vague references to risk in
virtually every state's laws, and by the states' failures to distinguish between
"against-facility-advice" scenarios and "inadequate care" scenarios.
In both Wisconsin and Arkansas, for example, the inconsistency is shown by
laws referring both to dispute resolution and a resident's consent to inadequate
care. Iowa law is similarly inconsistent, mandating disclosure of risk policies but
never defining a risk policy in a meaningful way. Furthermore, the law is not even
consistent in the four states that prohibit liability waivers, because the prohibition
conflicts with the laws' discussions of risk and risk agreements. Inter-state
ambiguities and inconsistencies are demonstrated by this article's need to create
eight separate categories to describe sixteen states. Negotiated risk differs greatly
from one state to another and, depending on the state, negotiated risk may refer to
dispute resolution, care planning, or a resident's consent to inadequate care. The
law may refer to a resident's acceptance of risk or instead may prohibit any waiver
of a facility's liability.
VII.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS SCANT

Negotiated risk literature is theoretical rather than empirical, with two
exceptions. One of these exceptions, a survey of facility administrators, found
eighty-two instances in which negotiated risk agreements were used. 164 "Falling"
and "wandering"--each from the "inadequate care" scenario-were identified as
the most common issues addressed in negotiated risk agreements. 65 The survey,
however, did not describe the terms of the agreements or the types of situations
involved, or whether agreements arose from "inadequate care" scenarios or
1 66
"against-facility-advice" scenarios.
A recent study reviewed thirty-one negotiated risk agreements in three states:
Florida, Oregon, and Wisconsin.' 67 The majority of the reviewed agreements
evidently would be classified under the "against-facility-advice" scenario, because
they pertained to "noncompliance with diabetic diets, refusing a prescribed pureed
diet, refusing monitoring of vital signs (pulse and blood pressure), refusing to use a
walker or wheelchair, choosing to use bedrails, taking unaccompanied walks, self-

164. Keren Brown Wilson et al., Negotiated Risk Agreements: Opportunity or Exploitation?, 7
ETHICS L. & AGING REV. 59, 76 (2001).

165. Id. at 76. "Falling" was addressed in 21.95 percent of the agreements, while "wandering" was
addressed in 13.41 percent of the agreements. Id.
166. Id. at 71-77.
167. JENKENS ET AL., supra note 3, at 31-32.
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managing medications, refusing housekeeping, and assisting another resident who
168
uses a wheelchair."
In the study, some negotiated risk agreements focused on a resident's
condition rather than his or her decisions. For a resident who was blind, as well as
another resident with spinal stenosis, 169 a negotiated risk agreement identified a risk
of falling. For a morbidly obese resident who could not wear shoes, a negotiated
risk agreement identified a risk of falling, skin breakdown, and foot infection.
"Possible alternatives" for the obese residents were weight reduction programs,
170
foot protection, weight-loss medication, surgery, and transfer to a nursing home.
In one Wisconsin facility, all residents at high risk for falling were required, at
admission, to sign a negotiated risk agreement pertaining to the risk of falling.1 7 1 In
Oregon, several of the negotiated risk agreements concerned smoking in nonsmoking areas, 172 even though smoking can be a risk to persons other than the
smoker. Most of the other Oregon agreements concerned behaviors that were
offensive to others but not dangerous, such as yelling, playing loud music, being
1 73
intoxicated, and watching pornography in the presence of housekeeping staff.
Examination of the content of the Oregon negotiated risk agreements revealed that
many followed the "against-facility-advice" scenario-a resident's behavior or
being written to "protect
choice presenting a potential risk, as well as the agreement
1 74
the resident's autonomy" but in an unspecified way.
In several Oregon negotiated risk agreements, however, the identified risk
was the risk of eviction if the resident failed to comply with facility rules.
Interviews with Oregon assisted living experts revealed that negotiated risk
agreements were used commonly to support 75an eviction, by demonstrating a
facility's pre-eviction efforts to warn a resident.'
The study found in Wisconsin that some negotiated risk agreements were
used to document what a facility would not do to address a particular risk.
Regarding one resident's refusal to comply with a diabetic diet, a negotiated risk
agreement specified that the facility could not supervise the resident's dietary
intake on a 24-hour basis, prevent the resident's purchases at the facility's store, or

168. Id. at 31.
169. "Spinal stenosis is a narrowing of spaces in the spine (backbone) that results in pressure on the
Pressure on the lower part of the spinal cord or on nerve roots
spinal cord and/or nerve roots ....
branching out from that area may give rise to pain or numbness in the legs." Questions and Answers
about Spinal Stenosis, National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (2006),
www.niams.nih.gov/hi/topics/spinalstenosis/spinalsten.htm.
170. JENKENS ET AL., supra note 3, at 3 1.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 32.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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remove candy from the resident's living quarters. 176 Another agreement pertained
to a resident who took walks, stating that the facility could not provide escorts for
77
walks and did not offer 24-hour monitoring of residents' whereabouts.1
VIII. WHY NEGOTIATED RISK SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM LAW

A.

Negotiated Risk is Unnecessary; Residents Can Refuse Available Services
Without Signing Agreements

As discussed previously, proponents of negotiated risk recommend it as a
mechanism to allow residents to refuse unwanted services or advice. This
argument's flaw is that residents of assisted living facilities should have the right to
refuse services or advice without signing any agreement. Proponents' arguments
are based in significant part on comparisons with nursing homes, but the "againstfacility-advice" scenario mischaracterizes life in a nursing home. For example, an
earlier-cited negotiated risk policy paper alleges that "classic" flaws in nursing
home care include "the use of restraints to prevent falls and 'mandated'
participation in social activities."' 17 8 Actually, restraints can be used in a nursing
home only with a physician's order and the consent of the resident or resident's
representative. 179 Use of restraints must be "to treat the resident's medical
symptoms" and never for the staffs convenience. 180 Likewise, activities must be
offered' 1 but "resident choice" is a recognized reason for a resident to forego
participation. 182
In the words of one health policy specialist, "regulations are often blamed
unfairly for autonomy incursions that are not regulatorily mandated."' 83 Providers
and their representatives not infrequently exaggerate the stringency of regulatory
requirements, due to a general risk aversion and "law-related anxieties' ' 84 that
often are not well founded:

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Kapp & Wilson, supra note 57, at 7.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(ii), 1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(ii), 1396r(c)(l)(A)(ii) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 483.13(a) (2006).
42 C.F.R. § 483.15(0(1).

182. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUBL'N
No. 100-07, APPENDIX PP TO STATE OPERATIONS MANUAL, SURVEYOR'S GUIDELINE TO 42 C.F.R.

§ 483.15(0(1) (2006), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Manuals/IOM/list.asp. It is worth noting that the offered
activities must be "designed to meet, in accordance with the comprehensive assessment, the interests and
the physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being of each resident." 42 C.F.R. § 483.15(0(1).
183. Kane, supra note 20, at 83.
184. Kapp & Wilson, supra note 57, at 8; Kapp, supra note 17, at 58 (discussing "law-related
anxiety").
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If it is taken as a given that most residents should not go outside
unaccompanied, be in a bathtub in privacy, have a glass of wine without
a doctor's prescription, or stay awake in a chair watching a late movie, it
is not because specific regulations prohibit these events. Rather, it is
because providers fear that untoward consequences will be judged as
neglectful or substandard care. They may also believe that only an
unaffordable level of staff supervision and attention would make
individualization of schedules possible on a widespread
basis and that
185
residents should not be left alone on any account.
For example, nursing home staff members frequently force residents to wake
up at early hours with the explanation that the federal nursing home law requires
that no more than fourteen hours elapse between the evening meal and the
following day's breakfast. 186 In one case study, 187 the "real" reasons for this
practice included various institutional and staff needs, along with an improperly
paternalistic fear that the resident might stay in bed all day if not awakened at the
crack of dawn. 188 The author found that it was:
[D]ifficult to view [the regulations] as any more than a rationalizationeven a form of "bad faith"-for the nursing home's conduct.... At a
minimum the federal regulation regarding the time between meals
establishes the institution's obligation to provide meals at those
intervals, but it would be surprising if the regulation also required that
residents accept or receive all meals. And yet that is how the nursing
home interpreted the regulation. The logic of this interpretation would
even require force-feeding of resistant autonomous residents, not only to
protect their life and health. The implausibility of such an interpretation
is another reason to suspect that the institution is displaying bad faith in
its conflict with [the resident]. 8 9
Under the federal Nursing Home Reform Law (Reform Law),' 90 as well as
constitutional and common law pertaining to health care decision-making,' 91

185. Kane, supra note 20, at 78.
186. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.35(f)(2) ("There must be no more than 14 hours between a substantial
evening meal and breakfast the following day.").
187. The case is one of eighteen cases derived from study data. Each of these cases "may illustrate
the predicament of more than one resident and perhaps of several staff members as well." Rosalie A.
Kane & Arthur L. Caplan, Preface to EVERYDAY ETHICS: RESOLVING DILEMMAS IN NURSING HOME
LIFE, at xi, xii (Rosalie A. Kane & Arthur L. Caplan eds., 1990).
188. James F. Childress, If You Let Them, They'd Stay in Bed All Morning: The Tyranny of
Regulation in Nursing Home Life, in EVERYDAY ETHICS: RESOLVING DILEMMAS IN NURSING HOME
LIFE, supranote 187, at 79, 85.
189. Id. at 86-88 (emphasis in original).
190. The federal Nursing Home Reform Law applies to every nursing home that is certified to accept
reimbursement from the federal Medicare program, the federal Medicaid program, or both. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395i-3 (2000) (defining as applicable to Medicare-certified facilities); id. § 1396r (defining as
applicable to Medicaid-certified facilities); 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.5-483.75 (outlining the regulations for
facilities that are certified for Medicare reimbursement, Medicaid reimbursement, or both). Because of
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nursing home residents generally have the right to make decisions regarding their
health care and their day-to-day lives, subject on occasion to certain commonsense
limitations. Under the Reform Law's regulations, a nursing home "must promote
care for residents in a manner and in an environment that maintains or enhances
' 92
each resident's dignity and respect in full recognition of his or her individuality."'
The Reform Law itself specifies that a nursing home resident has the right "to
reside and receive services with reasonable accommodation of individual needs and
preferences, except where the health or safety of the individual or other residents
would be endangered."' 193 A regulation implementing the Reform Law specifies
that a resident may "[c]hoose activities, schedules, and health care consistent with
' 94
his or her interests, assessments, and plans of care."'
In fact, under the Reform Law, a diabetic nursing home resident can choose to
eat cake. 195 A nursing home resident can also self-administer medication, as long as
the facility's interdisciplinary team determines that self-administration will be
safe. 19 6 Regarding baths, the federal Surveyor's Guidelines to the federal nursing
home regulations go into great detail regarding a nursing home's obligations to
accommodate a resident's preferences:
The facility must demonstrate that it accommodates residents' needs.
For example, if the resident refuses a bath because he or she prefers a
shower, prefers it at a different time of day or on a different day, does
not feel well that day, is uneasy about the aide assigned to help or is
worried about falling, the staff should make the necessary adjustments
realizing the resident is not refusing to be clean but refusing the bath
under the circumstance provided. The facility staff should meet with the
resident to make adjustments in the care plan to accommodate his or her
needs. 197
Exercise of each of these rights in a nursing home does not require the
resident to sign any type of agreement, or release the nursing home from liability.

the ubiquity of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement in nursing home care, over ninety-seven percent
of the nation's nursing homes are subject to the Reform Law. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE NATIONAL NURSING HOME SURVEY: 1999
SUMMARY 7.

191. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
192. 42 C.F.R. § 483.15(a) (2006).
193. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(v)(1), 1396r(c)(l)(A)(v)(I); see also 42 C.F.R. § 483.15(e)(1).
194. 42 C.F.R. § 483.15(b)(1).
195. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(b)(4) (describing a resident's right to refuse medical treatment). The federal
nursing home regulations do not directly address the issue of whether a diabetic resident could choose to
eat sweets; rather, it can be presumed that the right to refuse medical treatment encompasses the right to
eat food that is medically contraindicated, such as a diabetic resident's right to eat sweets.
196. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(n).
197. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra

note 182, at § 483.15(e).
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All the necessary arrangements can take
place in the care plan meetings that
198
nursing homes conduct for each resident.
Admittedly, the right to choose in the nursing home is not unlimited. In the
examples cited above, a resident who refused all baths undoubtedly would be
pressured to clean up. And self-administration of medication could be denied by the
facility's interdisciplinary team, which includes the resident's physician, a
registered nurse that cares for the resident, and other facility staff as appropriate., 99
These limitations, presumably affecting a minuscule percentage of nursing
home residents, are an unconvincing justification for negotiated risk. It is arguable
whether any resident should be allowed to forego bathing entirely. It also is
arguable whether a resident who is incompetent to administer her own medication,
in the opinion of an interdisciplinary team, should be allowed to self-administer
regardless in a long-term care facility. In that instance, self-administration could
endanger both the self-administering resident and other residents as well, if the selfadministering resident were to leave medication accessible to residents with
dementia.
Indeed, states' assisted living rules frequently contain similar limitations on
the ability of residents to self-administer medication.200 Similarly, negotiated risk
laws often specify that other residents are not to be put at risk. 20 1 For these reasons,
negotiated risk limits rather than enhances autonomy. In nursing homes across the
country, a resident generally has the right to reject a facility's recommendations as
long the resident does not endanger the health or safety of others.20 2 In negotiated
risk, however, a resident can reject a facility's recommendations only after
negotiating and signing an agreement that likely waives certain of the resident's
rights.

198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2); 1396r(b)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(k)(2).
199. 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(k)(2)(ii).
200. See, e.g., KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 28-39-147(p) (2006) ("[A] resident may self-administer drugs
unless a registered professional nurse or a physician has determined that this practice is unsafe.").
201. See, e.g., HAW. ADMIN. R. 11-90-2 (1999) ("'Managed risk' means a formal processof
negotiating and developing a plan ... to reduce the probability of a poor outcome for the resident or of
putting others at risk for adverse consequences" (emphasis added)); 016-06-001 ARK. CODE R. § 704
(Weil 2005) (effective Aug. 1, 2003) ("The choice and independence of action of a resident may need to
be limited when a resident's individual choice, preference, or actions, are identified as placing the
resident or others at risk, lead to adverse outcomes, or violate the norms of the facility or program or the
majority of the residents,or any combination of these events." (emphasis added)) (defining as applicable
to Level I facilities); 016-06-002 ARK. CODE R. § 704 (Weil 2005) (effective Aug. 1, 2002) (stating the
same) (defining as applicable to Level 11facilities).
202. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(c)(2)(A)(iii)-(iv) (2000); 1396r(c)(2)(A)(iii)-(iv) (2000) (justifying
involuntary transfers or discharge from nursing home if residents are endangering the health or safety of
others); 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(a)(2)(iii)-(iv) (discussing the same).
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B.
1.

Negotiated Risk Agreements Violate PublicPolicy

Assumption of Risk

Negotiated risk laws frequently speak of a resident accepting risk.20 3 In
Oregon, a resident may decide to "accept the consequences" of his or her
behavior. 20 4 Florida law refers to a resident's right to "assume risks., 20 5 A resident

"accepts responsibility" in Wisconsin, °6 and, in Arkansas, acknowledges
"acceptance of responsibility for the outcome from the agreed-upon course of
action. 2 °7
Negotiated risk proponents frequently cite a resident's "acceptance" or
"assumption" to argue that negotiated risk is justified by the legal doctrine of
assumption of risk.20 8 The legal analysis behind these arguments tends to be little
more than an assertion that assuming responsibility in negotiated risk is necessarily
equivalent to assuming the legal risk.
The term "assumption of risk" is particularly vulnerable to misinterpretation
or manipulation. What might seem at first glance to be simple and commonsensethat an individual be responsible for his own choices-is not. Justice Frankfurter
warned against confusing the vernacular sense of "assuming risk" with the legal
doctrine:
The phrase "assumption of risk" is an excellent illustration of the extent
to which uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase begins life
as a literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and
repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly used
to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas.20 9
In fact, to a significant extent the doctrine of assumption of risk is a relic. In
the same case, the majority of the Supreme Court stated:
Assumption of risk is a judicially created rule which was developed in
response to the general impulse of common law courts at the beginning
of [the industrial revolution] to insulate the employer as much as
possible from bearing the "human overhead" which is an inevitable part
of the cost-to someone-of the doing of industrialized business. The

203. See supra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
204. OR. ADMIN. R. 411-055-0000(24) (2006) (defining as applicable to residential care facilities);

id. 411-056-0005 (20) (defining as applicable to assisted living facilities).
205. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 58A-5.030(7)(c) (2007).

206. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 50.034 (3) (d) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006).
207. 016-06-001 ARK. CODE R. § 704 (Weil 2005) (effective Aug. 1, 2003) (defining as applicable
to Level I facilities), 016-06-002 ARK. CODE R. § 704 (Weil 2005) (effective Aug. 1, 2002) (defining as
applicable to Level II facilities).
208. See, e.g., BURGESS, supra note 31, at 21; Lynch & Teachworth, supra note 28, at 14-15; Kapp
& Wilson, supra note 57, at 9-10.
209. Tiller v. AtI. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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general purpose behind this development in the common law seems to
have been to give maximum freedom to expanding industry.1 °
As one prominent treatise states, "the whole spirit of the traditional defense [of
assumption of risk] and of the reasoning it employs bears the strong imprint of
laissez faire and its concomitant philosophy of individualism that has passed its
prime., 21 This attitude is well represented by Justice Cardozo's oft-quoted but
outdated admonition: "The timorous may stay at home. 2t 2
Now, of course, tort law has evolved on the premise that even the timorous
should feel free to leave the house. The doctrine of assumption of risk remains,
however, although its parameters have changed greatly over the years.
2.

Express Assumption of Risk

Assumption of risk can be either express or implied. This distinction is not
difficult to describe or grasp. An "express" assumption of risk involves a written
document in which one party assumes the risk of harm resulting from the other
party's negligence. 1 3 The doctrine of express assumption of risk thus applies to
negotiated risk under the "inadequate care" scenario-the resident signs a
negotiated risk agreement that expressly waives the facility's liability. Implied
assumption of risk will not be discussed in this article.
Express assumption of risk is justified by an individual's freedom to
contract. 1 4 This freedom is not insignificant-in general, "parties are free to enter
into any contract at their will, provided that the particular contract does not violate
21 5
the law or contravene public policy."
Freedom of contract must be weighed against another important valueresponsibility for one's negligent acts.216 Denying recovery to an injured plaintiff is
a harsh result, and liability waivers thus are subject to a jaundiced judicial eye.21 7
At one extreme is Virginia, which, pursuant to an 1890 decision of the
Virginia Supreme Court, declines enforcement of any liability waiver relating to

210. Id. at 58-59 (majority opinion).
211. 4 FOWLER HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 21.3, at 225 (2d ed. 1986).

212. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., Inc., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929).
213. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 482
(W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984); Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 703 n.4 (Cal. 1992); Schmidt v.
United States, 912 P.2d 871, 873 n.8 (Okla. 1996) ("Express assumption of the risk occurs in those cases
where the plaintiff expressly contracts with another not to sue for any future injuries which may be
caused by that person's negligence.") (emphasis omitted).
214. See, e.g., HARPER ET AL., supra note 211, at 248; Ransburg v. Richards, 770 N.E.2d 393, 395
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002); White v. Vill. of Homewood, 628 N.E.2d 616,618 (Il.
App. Ct. 1993).
215. Cudnik v. William Beaumont Hosp., 525 N.W.2d 891, 894 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); see also
HARPER ET AL., supra note 211, at 248-50.
216. Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo. 1989).
217. Cornell v. Council of Unit Owners Haw. Vill. Condos., Inc., 983 F. Supp. 640, 643 (D. Md.
1997); Simkin, 784 P.2d at 783-84.
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personal injury. 218 At the other extreme is Missouri, which does not consider
liability waivers to be contrary to public policy, but nonetheless strictly construes
219
such waivers against the party claiming waiver of liability.
In most states, liability waivers are not per se unenforceable but, to varying
extents, they are not looked upon favorably. Some courts characterize the clauses as
generally enforceable but nonetheless unpalatable.22 ° Other courts reverse the
emphasis, stating that liability waivers are suspect or generally unenforceable.22'
Liability for intentional torts or gross negligence is not waivable. 222 Any
obligations imposed by statute or regulation are also non-waivable. 223 The
disfavored nature of liability waivers is most broadly expressed through
invocations of "public policy": in general, enforcement of a liability waiver will be
224
denied if the waiver violates public policy.
Courts articulate the relevant factors in a variety of ways. Colorado courts, for
example, examine four factors: (1) duty to the public; (2) nature of services
performed; (3) fairness of the contracting process, and (4) clarity of the exculpatory
language. 5 In Oklahoma, a liability waiver must navigate "a gauntlet ofjudiciallycrafted hurdles," including requirements that the language of the clause be clear
and unambiguous, that there be no vast difference in bargaining power, and that
enforcement of the clause not be "injurious to public health, public morals or
confidence in administration of the law," and also not "undermine the security of
individual rights vis-A-vis personal safety or private property as to violate public
2 26

policy.

218. Johnson's Adm'x v. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co., I I S.E. 829, 829-30 (Va. 1890); see Hiett
v. Lake Barcrofl Community Ass'n, Inc., 418 S.E.2d 894, 895 (Va. 1992) (confirming continued validity
of Johnson'sAdm 'x).
219. Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l of Mo., Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo. 1996).
220. See, e.g., Burd v. KL Shangri-La Owners, L.P., 67 P.3d 927, 929 (Okla Civ. App. 2002)
("While these exculpatory promise-based obligations are generally enforceable, they are distasteful to
the law.") (emphasis in original); Ransburg v. Richards, 770 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
(upholding the general validity of exculpatory clauses unless parties have unequal bargaining power, the
contract is unconscionable, or the transaction affects public interest).
221. See, e.g., Barnes v. N.H. Karting Ass'n, Inc., 509 A.2d 151, 154 (N.H. 1986) ("In New
Hampshire, exculpatory contracts are generally prohibited.").
222. See, e.g., Lamp v. Reynolds, 645 N.W.2d 311, 314 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); Alack, 923 S.W.2d
at 337; Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779, 785 (Wash. 1996); Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593
N.E.2d 1365, 1370-71 (N.Y. 1992).
223. See, e.g., HARPER ET AL., supra note 211, at 252.
224. See, e.g., Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1994).
225. Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981); see also Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987) (employing the same four factors used by the Dressel
court).
226. Schmidt, 912 P.2d at 874 (emphasis omitted).
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The most frequently cited test is the one articulated by the California Supreme
227
Court in Tunkl v. Regents of University of California.
As might be expected, the
test is a list of factors, rather than an algorithm. The Tunkl court characterized the
relevant "social forces" as "volatile and dynamic," and concluded that, as a result,
"[n]o definition of the concept of public interest can be contained within the four
228
comers of a formula.,
Under the Tunkl test, a liability waiver violates public policy if the clause
"involves a transaction which exhibits some or all of the following characteristics:"
[B]usiness of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation; ...
[S]ervice of great public importance to the public, which is often a
matter of practical necessity for some members of the public;.. .[Seller]
holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of
the public who seeks it; ... [Seller] possesses a decisive advantage of
bargaining strength; ... [Seller] confronts the public with a standardized
adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a
purchaser may pay [a higher price to] obtain protection against
negligence; [and Buyer's] person or property .. .is placed under
the
22 9
control of the seller, subject to the risk of [the seller's] carelessness.
Many states explicitly follow the factors set forth in Tunkl.23 ° Other states cite
the Tunkl factors in a mix-and-match fashion, discussing only some of the Tunkl
factors and often adding other factors to the balancing process. 23' Some states
ignore the Tunkl factors entirely, and instead apply an intuitive "totality of the
circumstances" test.232
Overall, there is significant overlap between states' tests for determining the
enforceability of liability waivers. The Tunkl test itself is an amalgam of factors
used by other states 233 and, as discussed, the Tunkl test has been used and modified
by other states.

227. 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). See also Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 797 (Vt. 1995) (stating
that Tunkl sets forth "[t]he leading judicial formula for determining whether an exculpatory agreement
violates public policy").
228. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 444.
229. Id. at 445-46.
230. See, e.g., Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968, 971 (Wash. 1988); Olson v. Molzen,
558 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tenn. 1977) ("We think these criteria are sound and we adopt them.").
231. See, e.g., Milligan v. Big Valley Corp., 754 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Wyo. 1988) (discussing certain
Tunkl factors, to determine whether a duty to the public existed, in order to apply the four-part test);
Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981) (discussing the same).
232. Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522, 527 (Md. 1994) (applying a test based on "the totality of the
circumstances of any given case against the backdrop of current societal expectations"); Dalury, 670
A.2d at 798 (discussing the same, quoting from Woyl).
233. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445-46 nn.l 1-13; see also Belshaw v. Feinstein, 65 Cal. Rptr. 788, 798 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1968) (citing Tunkl and invalidating liability waivers used by neurosurgeons).
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3.

Liability Waivers in Health Care

Since negotiated risk deals with care provided--or not provided-to a
resident, the relevant cases are those drawn from the health care arena. ALFA's
negotiated risk manual claims that liability waivers "are routinely used by hospitals
and physicians when discussing with seniors the risks of specific medical
procedures or treatments, ' 34 but the opposite is true. Across the board, courts have
invalidated liability waivers that purport to release a health care provider from
liability for negligence. "In the field of medical risks," notes one commenter,
"courts have generally rejected out-of-hand attempts by physicians and hospitals to
shift the risk of negligence to patients. 235
Tunkl dealt with surgery conducted at the UCLA Medical Center. 236 The
consent form for Tunkl's surgery acknowledged that the hospital was a research
and education center and waived any liability claim that Tunkl otherwise might
have had against the hospital. 237 The hospital asserted the liability waiver, in a
lawsuit brought subsequently by Tunkl, but the California Supreme Court found the
waiver unenforceable. 238 The court noted that unenforceability did not require that
each Tunkl factor be present but that, in this case, each factor was present: the
hospital was subject to public regulation, surgery was a necessary and important
service performed by the hospital, the hospital held itself out as providing services
to the general public, the hospital had a decisive advantage of bargaining strength,
the hospital used a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and Tunkl put
himself under the hospital's control. 239
Using similar reasoning-that each of the Tunkl factors was present-the
Michigan Court of Appeals in Cudnick v. William Beaumont Hospital refused to
enforce a liability waiver in a case stemming from a post-radiation ulcer burn. 24 °
The court noted an "overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions" that had
previously refused to enforce liability waivers signed by hospital patients, based on
the reasoning that "medical treatment involves a particularly sensitive area of
public interest."24'
Indeed, courts have had little difficulty finding violations of public policy in
liability waivers for patients' health care. Regarding a failed abortion-the patient
remained pregnant-the Tennessee Supreme Court in Olson v. Molzen reasoned

234. BURGESS, supra note 31, at 44.
235. Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks Between Patients
and Providers, 49 LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 184 (1986).
236. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 442.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 448.
239. Id. at 446-47.
240. Cudnik v. William Beaumont Hosp., 525 N.W.2d 891, 895-96 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
241. Id. at 895.
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that "it beg[ged] the question to say [the plaintiff] could have gone to another
doctor or that she elected to undergo a surgical procedure that was not
mandatory. 242 Another physician also might have required a liability waiver, and
the plaintiff had a right to have a legal surgical procedure performed, even without
a "compelling medical necessity. '243 Overall, the court had little patience for
liability waivers in health care, stating that: "[a] professional person should not be
permitted to hide behind the protective shield of an exculpatory contract and insist
that he or she is not answerable for his or her own negligence. We do not approve
the procurement of a license to commit negligence in professional practice." 2 "
4.

Public Policy Test Applied to NegotiatedRisk
a. Analysis

This section of the article applies the relevant legal tests to negotiated risk.
This article has already explained why negotiated risk is unnecessary in the
"against-facility-advice" scenario, 245 and subsequently will discuss why confusion
caused by two differing scenarios is an independent reason for removing negotiated
risk from law.246 This article's analysis assumes that a negotiated risk agreement's
language is clear and unambiguous, and that the agreement is signed by a resident
who has the mental capacity to do SO. 2 47 In truth, however, these assumptions may
be false more often than not and, in practice, an agreement's invalidity may be
based primarily on its confusing nature or the resident's lack of capacity. This
article makes these assumptions, however, in order to move past agreement-specific
or resident-specific considerations, and focus instead on the general question of
whether a liability waiver in a negotiated risk agreement could be enforced.
To review, the Tunkl factors for determining a violation of public policy are:
1) a business suitable for public regulation; 2) a service of great public importance;

242. Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tenn. 1977).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 432; see also Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 275 S.E.2d 163, 167-69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)
(invalidating a liability waiver used by a university dental clinic (citing Tunkl, 383 P.2d 441)); Ash v.
New York Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (invalidating a dental
waiver); Smith v. Hosp. Auth. of Walker, Dade and Catoosa Counties, 287 S.E.2d 99, 101-02 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1981) (invalidating a liability waiver signed by a blood donor (citing Porubiansky, 275 S.E.2d
163)); Meiman v. Rehabilitation Ctr., Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (invalidating a
liability waiver related to a broken leg suffered during physical therapy (citing Tunki, 383 P.2d 441)).
245. See supra Part VIII.A.
246. See infra Part VIII.C.
247. Guardians generally may not waive liability on a ward's behalf. See, e.g., Gibson v. Anderson,
92 So. 2d 692, 696 (Ala. 1956) ("It is the prevailing view that a guardian may not waive legal rights in
behalf of his ward, or surrender or impair rights vested in the ward, or impose any legal burden
thereon."); Ortman v. Kane, 60 N.E.2d 93, 98 (II1. 1945) ("Neither a guardian nor a conservator may do
anything which will operate as a waiver or estoppel against the ward.").
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3) a seller willing to perform a service for any member of public; 4) a seller with a
decisive bargaining advantage; 5) an adhesion contract; and 6) a buyer under the
seller's control. In assisted living, factors 1, 2, 3, and 6 will be met, regardless of
the waiver's specific language. Assisted living is suitable for regulation, assisted
living services are of public importance, assisted living facilities offer their services
to the general public, and residents are under a facility's control.
If a negotiated risk agreement waives a facility's liability for the facility's
potential inability to meet a resident's needs-this is the "inadequate care"
scenario-the agreement likely also meets the remaining Tunkl factors, relating to a
seller with a decisive bargaining advantage (factor 4) who uses an adhesion
contract (factor 5). Most likely, the resident would have little ability to negotiate
different or better terms. As discussed above, courts recognize that health care
professionals have the upper hand when negotiating with patients.2 48 Thus, a court
would likely recognize that an assisted living resident could not be expected to
refuse a facility's request, or demand, to sign a negotiated risk agreement.
The same analysis holds true if a liability waiver is assumed in the "againstfacility-advice" scenario. For example, if an insulin-dependent diabetic resident
signs a liability waiver in return for the facility allowing her to eat chocolate
desserts, factors 1, 2, 3, and 6 are met because the resident signs the waiver in the
context of assisted living care; similarly, factors 4 and 5 are also met because the
resident will not realistically be able to refuse to sign the waiver.249
With regard to overreaching business practices, assisted living residents are at
least as vulnerable as-and, in reality, likely more vulnerable than-the surgery
patients, job applicants, abortion patients, and dental patients whose liability
waivers were invalidated in the cases discussed earlier.25 0 Assisted living residents
rely on the facility for assistance with simple daily necessities such as dressing,

248. See Olson, 558 S.W.2d at 431 ("It begs the question to say [the patient] could have gone to
another doctor .... "); Porubiansky, 275 S.E.2d at 167-69 (citing Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445-46, and
explaining that laypersons have little leverage to negotiate with health care professionals).
249. This is not to say that an assisted living facility automatically would be liable if, for example,
an insulin-dependent diabetic resident were to suffer adverse consequences from consuming sugar. Even
without a liability waiver, a court would take note of a resident's decision to consume sugar against the
facility's advice. See, e.g., Neville v. True, 900 F. Supp. 972, 976, 980 (N.D. 11. 1995) (finding no
medical malpractice, due in part to the patient's refusal of recommended pacemaker surgery); Davis v.
United States, 629 F. Supp. 1, 4-6 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (taking refusal of blood transfusions into account in
finding no medical malpractice).
250. See Tunkl, 383 P.2d 441 (invalidating a hospital's liability waiver where the patient suffered
injuries caused by a physician's negligence); Eelbode v. Chec Med. Ctrs, Inc., 984 P.2d 436 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999) (invalidating a medical clinic's liability waiver where a job applicant sustained injuries
during his pre-employment lifting test); Olson, 558 S.W.2d 429 (invalidating an abortion clinic's
liability waiver where an abortion procedure failed and the patient remained pregnant); Porubiansky,
275 S.E.2d 163 (invalidating a university dental clinic's liability waiver where a patient suffered injuries
caused by a dentist's negligence).

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 10:287

eating, and bathing. Once a resident has been admitted to a facility, moving to
another facility is especially difficult and traumatic.
Stepping back from the Tunkl factors leads to a slightly different perspective,
but yields the same result. As discussed, Tunki recognizes that the concept of
"public interest" cannot be captured completely in a formula.2 ' Some states
accordingly follow a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine a violation of
public policy. 252 Under such a test, the relevant question may be rephrased as

whether society should condone contracts that release an assisted living facility
from liability for negligent care of residents. The answer, this article suggests,
should be no. Residents cannot live independently, and, consequently, are
dependent upon the facility for numerous daily necessities. It is hard to imagine a
setting less appropriate for liability waivers.
In a recent personal injury case, a Delaware court issued a ruling consistent
with this article's analysis. 253 A resident's fall in an assisted living facility had
caused the resident to suffer irreversible brain damage and permanent physical
impairments. 4 Based on the resident's signed admission agreement, the facility
moved for summary judgment under assumption of risk. 255 The admission
agreement's relevant language was a m6lange drawn from both the "inadequate
care" and "against-facility-advice" scenarios, and included an explicit waiver of
liability:
The Resident acknowledges that these principles of independence,
control, and choice will result in a higher quality of life for each resident
in the community, recognizes the additional risk that results from the
ability of the Resident to make such choices, and agrees to mutually
accept and share this risk ....

Resident agrees that [the facility] shall not

be liable to Resident for personal injuries or damage to property, even if
resulting from the negligence of [the facility] or its employees, unless
resulting from its gross negligence or willful misconduct. Resident
acknowledges that the independence, control and choice afforded within
[the facility] requires that the Resident assume responsibility for any
loss, injury or damage resulting from Resident's personal actions and
conduct.256
The Delaware court's analysis distinguished assisted living from a group of
sports-related cases in which assumption of risk has most commonly been

251. 383 P.2d at 444.
252. See, e.g., Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522, 527 (Md. 1994); Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795,
798 (Vt. 1995) (quoting Wolf 644 A.2d at 527).
253. Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005).

254. Id. at 876, 878.
255. Id. at 876, 878-79.
256. Id. at 878-79.
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applied. 257 "[T]wo common themes" were present in the sports-related cases. First,
the injured party had chosen "to engage in the activity, not out of necessity but out
of a desire to satisfy a personal preference. 258 Second, the injured party must have
participated in the sport with knowledge, and he and other participants may not
have acted with ordinary care.259 In these sports cases, "the absence of such a
defense would chill vigorous participation in the sporting activity and have a
as a whole., 260 The court mentioned the
deleterious effect on the nature of the sport
26 1
league.
example of a recreational hockey
Neither of the common themes found in the sports cases was present in the
resident's allegations against the assisted living facility. The resident had entered
assisted living not out of choice, but because he required care due to multiple
sclerosis and an alcohol addiction.262 Also, a recipient of health care cannot agree
to less than "ordinary care":
[T]here is virtually no scenario in which a patient can consent to allow a
healthcare provider to exercise less than "ordinary care" in the provision
of services. Even if given, a patient's consent to allow a healthcare
provider to exercise less than ordinary care would be specious when
considered against the strict legal, ethical and professional standards that
regulate the healthcare profession. Regardless of whether the patient
elects to have healthcare or requires it, the patient appropriately expects
that the treatment will be rendered in accordance with the applicable
standard of care. This is so regardless of how risky or dangerous the
procedure or treatment modality might be.263
The Delaware court concluded that "[p]ermitting a primary assumption of the risk
defense under these circumstances would simply be unconscionable. 264 As further
support for its ruling, the court cited the statutory and regulatory duties of health
care providers generally and of assisted living providers specifically. Given the
state's interest in establishing and protecting an adequate quality of care, the court
reasoned that it was improper for quality of care to be compromised by individual
agreements between a facility and resident. 265 The court noted, as discussed

257. See infra notes 274-281 and accompanying text for discussion of assumption of risk in extreme
and recreational sports.
258. Storm, 898 A.2d at 883.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 877.
263. Id. at 884.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 885.
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previously in this article, that a Delaware regulation explicitly prohibits liability
waivers in negotiated risk agreements.266
b. Addressing Proponents' Arguments
Even facility attorneys and negotiated risk proponents recognize that
negotiated risk agreements may not be enforceable.267 One facility attorney, in an
informational resource developed for the American Association of Homes and
Services for the Aging, goes further and suggests that a negotiated risk agreement
would be rejected by a court:
While it is important for a provider to detail the full scope of provided
and excluded services, and it is important to involve the resident and his
or her family in the planning of care, it may be a mistake to assume that
the facility can absolve itself of responsibility for the resident by
negotiating and having the resident execute a waiver, release of liability,
or other form of "negotiated risk agreement." No matter what an
assisted living provider recites in the contract, it may be liable if
avoidable harm to a resident in its facility is foreseeable and the
provider stands by and makes no reasonable effort to intervene. Any
written contract that purports to exonerate a facility from such a
fundamental civil duty is likely to be deemed by the courts to be
unconscionable and against public policy, particularly when a waiver or
release pertains to future unknown events. Moreover, an elderly person
signing such an agreement probably will be considered disadvantaged
and unable to engage in an enforceable, arm's-length transaction. 268
Only one negotiated risk defense cites case law in any depth.269 Ultimately,
this defense makes only the limited claim that negotiated risk agreements "are not
inherently unenforceable., 270 Even this modest claim cannot withstand scrutiny,
however. For one, the defense argues that privately-owned assisted living facilities

266. Id. at 885-86.; see supra Part VI.H.2. The court mistakenly cited to 40-700-007 DEL. CODE
REGS. § 63.611, rather than citing correctly to Section 63.612. Storm, 898 A.2d at 885. These
regulations became effective in 2002, the same year in which the resident entered the facility and
suffered the fall. Id. These regulations have since been renumbered, although the text of the negotiated
risk regulation remains substantially similar. See 40-300-005 DEL. CODE REGS. § 63.229 (Weil 2007).
267. See, e.g., BURGESS, supra note 31, at 61 ("In reality, even should a provider enter one of these
agreements primarily for the purpose of avoiding legal responsibility, they [sic] could be sorely
disappointed. Liability determinations depend on many factors and the presence of a negotiated risk
agreement may or may not control a court's ultimate determination."); Lynch & Teachworth, supra note
28, at 23 ("[A]t best, it's a close call as to whether a [negotiated risk agreement] might violate public
policy.").
268. PAUL GORDON, AM. ASs'N OF HOMES AND SERVS. FOR THE AGING, ASSISTED LIVING
ADMISSION AGREEMENTS: PROVISIONS ESSENTIAL TO SOUND MGMT. 3 (1999).

269. Lynch & Teachworth, supra note 28, at 3-29.
270. Id. at 24.
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do not owe a duty to the public at large. 27' This claim is refuted by the many cases
272
the
Also, th
that have struck down liability waivers used by private enterprises.
defense argues that negotiated risk "may or may not" involve a service of public
importance.273 As a practical matter, however, a negotiated risk agreement will be
written only when a resident faces some non-trivial risk of injury. Given an assisted
living facility's general obligation to provide for residents' well-being, a real-life
waiver of facility liability always will involve a service of public importance, even
in the "against-facility-advice" scenario. For example, a service of public
importance would be involved if a facility acted negligently in relation to an
insulin-dependent resident's desire to eat sweets, or a resident's self-administration
of medication.
Finally, the defense's case authority is drawn exclusively, and incongruously,
from cases involving extreme and recreational sports.274 These cases concern
"scuba diving, race tracks (including spectators in the race track pit), motorcycle
riding tracks, skiing (including lessons and equipment rental), health club
memberships, horseback riding and beach club memberships, ' '275 none of which
bear any relationship to assisted living. The defense observes, accurately, that
sports-related liability waivers have been both upheld and struck down. 27 6 The next
step of the argument is unsupported: the defense concludes from the sports-related
cases that liability waivers are potentially viable in assisted living.277
The defense's obvious flaw is its unwarranted focus on extreme and
recreational sports, and the consequent failure to examine negotiated risk in the
context of health care. The defense claims that sports-related liability waivers "are
the distant cousins that [negotiated risk agreements] never knew they had," but
nothing in the defense supports this claim. 278 Presumably, the reliance on sports
cases by the defense, and by the assisted living facility in the Delaware case,

271. Id.
272. See, e.g., Eelbode v. Chec Med. Ctrs, Inc., 984 P.2d 436 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (invalidating a
private physical therapist's liability waiver); Cudnik v. William Beaumont Hosp., 525 N.W.2d 891, 895
n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) ("We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that the provision of
medical care should be considered a 'private affair.' The courts have long recognized that the provision
of medical care involves issues of public interest." (internal citations omitted)); Olson v. Molzen, 558
S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977) (invalidating a private osteopath's liability waiver).
273. Id. at 23.
274. Lynch & Teachworth, supra note 28, at 19-20. The defense's authors report that they drew their
cases from the annotations of two American Law Reports (A.L.R.) articles. Id. at 28 nn.133 & 138; see
Michele Meyer McCarthy, Annotation, Tort Liability Arising From Skydiving, Parachuting, or
ParasailingAccident, 92 A.L.R.5th 473 (2001); Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Validity, Construction,
and Effect of Agreement Exempting Operator of Amusement Facility From Liabilityfor PersonalInjury
or Death of Patron,54 A.L.R.5th 513 (1997).
275. Lynch & Teachworth, supra note 28, at 21.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 23-24.
278. Id. at 19.
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reflects a results-driven analysis. The sports cases have been put forward not
because they are analogous to assisted living, but because sport is virtually the only
consumer context in which liability waivers are potentially enforceable.279
The defense also claims that negotiated risk agreements are more likely than
sports-related liability waivers to be enforced, because negotiated risk agreements
"are themselves an expression of an established public policy in the law and in
society-that of accommodating and maximizing choice-for residents in
particular and disabled persons in general., 280 Again, the defense's claim is not
supportable. The defense's "established public policy" is societal disapproval of
disability-based discrimination, 281 which iis hardly equivalent to approval of
negotiated risk. True maximization of resident choice would allow resident choices
to be made without liability waivers.
C.

The Term "NegotiatedRisk" is Not Useful

This article's recurring theme is the slipperiness of the term "negotiated risk."
The words "negotiated" and "risk" themselves are reasonably evocative of the
original meaning-the "inadequate care" scenario. Over the years, however, the
"inadequate care" scenario and the "against-facility-advice" scenario have become
hopelessly confused.282 The best example of this confusion is state negotiated risk
laws. As previously discussed, state law is both ambiguous and inconsistent in its
treatment of negotiated risk.283 Depending on the state, a negotiated risk agreement
may be used to resolve disputes or to plan care. The agreement may be designed to
reduce the resident's risk or consent to inadequate care. In some states, negotiated
risk laws leave open the possibility of a liability waiver, whereas, in other states,
the laws explicitly bar any liability waivers.
Despite, or perhaps because of, state laws' confusing treatment of negotiated
risk, negotiated risk proponents often cite state law as evidence that negotiated risk

279. See, e.g., Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779, 783 (Wash. 1996) ("Outside of these
voluntary high-risk sports situations, our courts have often found preinjury releases for negligence to
violate public policy."); Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874, 883 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005)
(finding that the assumption of risk defense "most frequently surfaces in cases of sports-related activities
that involve physical skill and challenges posing significant risk of injury to participants ....
(quotations omitted)).
280. Lynch & Teachworth, supra note.28, at 23 (emphasis in original).
281. In the Lynch & Teachworth article defending negotiated risk, the endnote for the asserted
"established public policy" cites only one case-the Supreme Court's opinion in Olmstead v. L.C., 527
U.S. 581, 607 (1999), holding that the Americans with Disabilities Act requires that state programs
develop adequate non-institutional placements for individuals with disabilities. Lynch & Teachworth,
supra note 28, at 23 n.147.
282. See, e.g.,
Robert G. Schwemm & Michael Allen, For the Rest of Their Lives: Seniors and the
Fair Housing Act, 90 IOWA L. REv. 121, 190-91 n.362 (2004) (discussing negotiated risk without
distinguishing between the "inadequate care" scenario and the "against-facility-advice" scenario).
283. See supra Part VI.
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is becoming well-established.284 For instance, one facility attorney has stated that
"[a]dding support to the prediction that negotiated risk agreements, when properly
used, will be supported by the courts, is the fact that a number of states expressly
refer to negotiated risk agreements in their licensing regulations for assisted
living. 285 Other facility attorneys cite the use of negotiated risk in state law as "a
telling sign that [negotiated risk agreements] are coming of age. 286 In a 2004
health care newsletter, a law firm reported that a negotiated risk agreement is
"[o]ne method of addressing [an] increased liability exposure," noting that
negotiated risk "is provided for by regulation in some states. 2 87 A related argument
relies on the fact that negotiated risk agreements have not been banned. In the
words of one article, "[w]hile only 12 states specifically address [negotiated risk
agreements], they have not been prohibited by any state. This is noteworthy in that
2 88
regulatory actions tend to be reactive responses designed to address concerns.',
These arguments illustrate the fundamental problem with the term "negotiated
risk": it no longer has any settled meaning. The presence of "negotiated risk" in
state law is in fact not evidence of negotiated risk's viability. Negotiated risk in
state law differs widely from one state to another. Furthermore, the pervasive
ambiguity of negotiated risk laws means that negotiated risk agreements within a
289
state may also differ widely.
This article recommends abandoning the terms "negotiated risk," "shared
responsibility," and "managed risk." If assisted living facilities or regulators wish
to advocate for the "inadequate care" scenario, those arguments should be made
explicitly, without euphemism. The "inadequate care" scenario is too important to
be glossed over by ambiguous language.
Abandoning negotiated risk will have a positive impact on the "againstfacility-advice" scenario. As discussed earlier, a nursing home resident already has
290
the right to act against facility advice, and to do so without waiving any rights.
By relying on the "against-facility-advice" scenario, however, negotiated risk
proponents have weakened the decision-making rights of assisted living residents.

284. See, e.g., Robert L. Kane & Rosalie A. Kane, What Older People Want From Long-Term Care,
and How They Can Get It, 20 HEALTH AFF. 114, 125 (2001).

285. BURGESS, supra note 31, at 22-23.
286. Lynch & Teachworth, supra note 28, at 9.
287. Limiting Liability in Assisted Living Residences, HEALTHCARE REV. (Duane Mortis LLP,
Philadelphia, Pa.), Spring 2004, at 4; see also Michael Anderson, Inside the Residency Agreement,
ASSISTED LIVING TODAY, July-Aug. 2003, at 56 (claiming, although without authority, that negotiated
risk agreements are "increasingly popular"); Anderson, supra note 60, at 71 (claiming, again without
authority, that negotiated risk agreements are "increasingly popular"); Burgess, supra note 33, at 35-37
(finding that states increasingly embrace negotiated risk concepts in their regulations).
288. Wilson et al., supra note 164, at 71.
289. See JENKENS ET AL., supra note 3, at 25-40 (presenting the "limited" and thus "not
generalizable" empirical knowledge available regarding negotiated risk agreements).
290. See supra Part VIII.A.
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As the word "negotiated" indicates, a resident has no right to act against facility
advice within the negotiated risk framework. Instead, the resident must negotiate
with the facility to act against facility advice, with no limitation on the concessions
that the facility might seek. The term "care planning," already widely used in both
nursing homes and assisted living facilities, does a much better job of describing
how a facility should approach a resident's inclination to refuse facility advice.
Care planning meetings generally involve both the facility staff and the resident;
issues are discussed, and decisions are documented. 291
CONCLUSION
Negotiated risk is hopelessly flawed. Although the term was introduced to
describe the "inadequate care" scenario, the proponents of negotiated risk now are
likely to defend it under the "against-facility-advice" scenario. This change has
caused confusion at many levels. Public policy articles generally fail to
acknowledge the different versions of negotiated risk. State laws are consistent
only in being ambiguous as to what negotiated risk means. Great uncertainty
surrounds the use of negotiated risk in practice, because no one knows what type of
agreements are in use, or how frequently the agreements are used.
Negotiated risk should be abandoned. First, in the "against-facility-advice"
scenario, negotiated risk agreements are unnecessary. Residents should be able to
refuse facility advice without negotiating away rights or signing a legal document.
Second, negotiated risk agreements are unenforceable if they waive a facility's
liability. Courts consistently have refused to enforce consumer liability waivers in
health care. Proponents' reliance on sports-related cases only highlights the
weakness of their arguments. Finally, the term "negotiated risk" is no longer
meaningful, regardless of the validity or invalidity of the various concepts
described now as "negotiated risk." Even if it were necessary for a resident to
negotiate and sign a legal document in the "against-facility-advice" scenario, or to
waive an assisted living facility's liability, the term "negotiated risk" is now too
confusing to be useful in either situation. New terminology must be used, and that
terminology must be specific enough to distinguish between the different assisted
living scenarios.
The abandonment of "negotiated risk" is important for the development of
assisted living. In many ways, assisted living is a work in progress. State assisted
living laws vary greatly, and the variations include such important matters as the
type of residents, the level of health care provided, and the qualifications of staff

291. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(2); 1396r(b)(2) (2001) (establishing care planning in nursing
homes); 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(k)(2) (2006) (establishing the same); ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 420-5-4.05(3)(g)(24) (2004) (establishing care planning in assisted living facilities); S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 6184 (2001) (establishing the same).
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members.292 Future assisted living policy development will require careful
examination of state policies and their consequences. This careful examination,
however, cannot take place if policies are obscured by ambiguous terms with
multiple meanings.
Specifically, assisted living policy development will be hampered unless
negotiated risk is dropped. Careful policy analysis requires an honest evaluation of
the types of residents appropriate for assisted living, and a facility's obligation to
meet a resident's increasing needs. Those important issues cannot be addressed as
long as negotiated risk continues to obscure residents' rights and facilities'
obligations.
Most importantly, negotiated risk should be abandoned because it endangers
vulnerable assisted living residents. Residents rely on facility staff in a multitude of
ways, so residents' health and safety is at risk if facilities can limit care simply by
obtaining residents' signatures on negotiated risk agreements.

292. CARLSON, supra note 11, at 13-16, 25-32, 53-61.

